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HOW THE CREATION OF APPELLATE COURTS 
IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
LIMITED JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE TO THE JURY 
By Renée Lettow Lerner
*
 
ABSTRACT 
The practice of judicial comment on the evidence has traditionally been 
the main form of jury control. Previous scholarly work has focused on the 
loss of the power in state courts, and has attributed the decline of judicial 
comment to a strict separation of functions between judge and jury and to 
regional differences in legal culture. This article examines two jurisdictions 
in which the power of comment long remained strong, at least in theory: 
the High Court of England, with its predecessors, and the federal courts in 
the United States. In both jurisdictions, judicial power to comment has been 
limited and in practice reduced, in the federal courts severely. The article 
reveals that this limitation developed with the advent of courts of appeal 
with separate personnel and especially of appeals in criminal cases. 
Lack of appeal, or limited appeal, has been a distinctive trait of 
common law systems, particularly in criminal cases. There was no appeal 
as of right in criminal cases until 1907 in England, and 1889 in the federal 
courts. In the federal system, the early movements to allow appeals in 
criminal cases and to limit judicial comment on evidence focused on 
controlling one judge: Isaac Parker, U.S. District Judge for the Western 
District of Arkansas, who presided over more than 100 trials for capital 
crimes occurring in the Indian Territory from 1875 to 1896. 
The article suggests that the most important traditional method of jury 
control—judicial comment on evidence—has proved to be unworkable in 
the judicial culture of the United States and difficult in England. Jury trial 
long impeded appeals, but when they arrived, appellate courts limited the 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, rlerner@law.gwu.edu. I thank 
Gregory Ablavsky, Bradford Clark, George Fisher, Lawrence Friedman, Robert Gordon, Emily 
Hammond, John Harrison, Amalia Kessler, John Langbein, Maeva Marcus, Alan Morrison, Cynthia 
Nicoletti, James Oldham, Saikrishna Prakash, Jonathan Rose, Sarah Seo, Frederick Schauer, and 
participants in the Stanford Law and Humanities Workshop, the University of Virginia Legal History 
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discretion of trial judges. In doing so, appellate courts focused on 
procedures rather than the merits of a case. In contrast, appeals in legal 
systems of the Continent of Europe are thorough and focused on the merits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of judicial comment on the evidence has traditionally been 
the main form of jury control.
1
 The practice concerns three features typical 
of common law systems: the use of lay decision-makers as exclusive judges 
of fact, the use of a single professional judge in the first instance, and lack 
of thorough appeals on the merits. This article examines two jurisdictions 
in which the power of comment long remained strong, at least in theory: 
the High Court of England, with its predecessors, and the federal courts in 
the United States. In both of these jurisdictions, trial judges have secure 
tenure and considerable prestige. In both jurisdictions, judicial power to 
comment has been limited and in practice reduced, in the federal courts 
severely. The article reveals that this limitation developed with the advent 
of courts of appeal with separate personnel. Appeals in criminal cases, 
especially, led to limitations on judicial comment on evidence. 
Lack of appeal, or limited appeal, has been a distinctive trait of 
common law systems, particularly in criminal cases. There was no appeal 
as of right whatsoever in criminal cases until 1907 in England
2
 and 1889 in 
the federal courts.
3
 In England, the development of a court of criminal 
appeal with a personnel mostly separate from that of the trial courts did not 
occur until 1966.
4
 In the federal system, the movements to allow appeals in 
criminal cases and to limit judicial comment on evidence focused initially 
on controlling one judge: Isaac Parker, U.S. District Judge for the Western 
District of Arkansas, who presided over more than 100 trials for capital 
crimes occurring in the Indian Territory from 1875 to 1896. The opinions 
of the Supreme Court reversing convictions for Judge Parker’s comments 
on evidence began a long process of limiting judicial comment in the 
federal courts. 
The article suggests that the most important traditional method of jury 
control—judicial comment on evidence—has proved to be unworkable in 
the judicial culture of the United States and difficult in England. Jury trial 
for centuries impeded appeals, but when they developed, appellate courts 
limited the discretion of trial judges. In doing so, appellate courts focused 
on procedures rather than the merits of a case. In contrast, appeals in 
Continental European legal systems o are thorough and focused on the 
merits. 
 
 1. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 431-33 (2009). 
 2. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23. 
 3. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 STAT. 655. 
 4. Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; see also D.A. Thomas, The Criminal Appeal Act 1966, 30 M.L.R. 
64, 64–65 (1967). 
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II. RATIONALES FOR JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE  
AND LACK OF APPEAL 
Adjudication by ordinary laypersons has long raised concerns, and 
these concerns grew more acute as common law systems became more 
adversarial. Judges and commentators have argued that lay jurors are apt to 
be confused by conflicting evidence, especially in complicated cases.
5
 
Jurors also may be swayed by the superior rhetorical skill of counsel for 
one side rather than the merits of a case.
6
 
To help correct these problems, a common law judge traditionally has 
the power to sum up the evidence at the end of trial and to comment on the 
evidence to the jury. The rationales that have long been given for these 
practices, and still are given today, are to prevent juror confusion and to 
counteract the partisanship of counsel.
7
 Tocqueville believed that the 
judge’s ability to comment on evidence was crucial to the proper 
functioning of juries. He stressed how important it was that the judge help 
to guide the jury: “It is he who unravels the various arguments they are 
finding it so hard to remember and takes them by the hand to guide them 
through procedural intricacies.”8 He acts as “a disinterested arbitrator 
between the litigants’ passions.”9 English treatise-writer Joseph Chitty, 
whose General Practice went through many American editions in the early 
nineteenth century and was a popular reference for American lawyers, 
believed judicial comment on evidence was necessary to counter the power 
of strong advocacy: “without this assistance from the learned judge, few 
juries would, in a contested cause, be able to come to an unanimous 
opinion, being frequently left in a state of great perplexity by the influence 
of the speeches of the contending leaders.”10 Judge Thomas Ruffin of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court also focused on the danger of powerful 
advocates. In an 1830 opinion, he explained that “after the able and 
ingenious, but interested and partial arguments of Counsel,” justice would 
be better served by the judge following with “his own calm, discreet, 
 
 5. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the 
Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 166 (1988); see 
also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury 
Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL  RTS. J. 811, 849–50 (2014). 
 6. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5, at 166. 
 7. Id. For a modern criticism of the judicial power to comment, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, The 
Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 34-46 (1978) (arguing 
that judicial comment on evidence threatens the independence of the jury and the adversarial system). 
 8. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., HarperCollins 1988) (1850). 
 9. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8. 
 10. 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS 913 (1836). 
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sensible and impartial summary of the case, including both law and fact.”11 
The judge should “aid[] the jury[] by rescuing the case from the false 
glosses of powerful advocates.”12 
A problem with these practices of judicial summing up and comment is 
that in common law systems, usually only one professional judge hears a 
trial. That judge may be biased, lazy, corrupt, or incompetent. No judicial 
colleagues are present in courts of the first instance to help correct such 
errors. The judicial summing up or comments on the evidence may 
therefore mislead the jury and cause or contribute to an improper verdict. 
Misleading judicial summing up or comment on the evidence might be 
corrected on appeal. But appeal has long been a weakness of common law 
systems. Jury verdicts do not lend themselves to appellate review. As a 
group of laypersons inexperienced in the law and evaluation of facts, a jury 
is not required to give reasons for what it does. A jury speaks unanimously, 
and mysteriously, like an oracle. One cannot subject the oracle at Delphi to 
appellate review. The common law, when it has permitted review at all, 
focuses on inputs, not outputs: whether particular evidence or judicial 
instructions should have gone to a jury, rather than the merits of the jury’s 
decision. 
In the eighteenth century, common law courts did not have courts of 
appeal with separate personnel; judges who presided over trials sat together 
to correct error.
13
 There was therefore the danger of less thorough review. 
In civil cases, appeals were often hampered by technical restrictions. 
(Throughout this article, I refer to various methods of review as “appeal,” 
even though technically the methods were writ of error, bill of exceptions, 
and other procedures.) In criminal cases, there was no review as of right at 
all until very late: 1889 in the U.S. federal courts in capital cases,
14
 and 
 
 11. State v. Moses, 13 N.C. 452, 458 (1830). Ruffin came from the Virginia tidewater elite and had 
studied, like his fellow Virginian James Madison, at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton). 
TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL 
DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, 131-35 (Kermit Hall ed.1999). 
 12. State v. Moses, 13 N.C. at 462. The judge was well-suited to do this, in Ruffin’s view, because 
typically he was “upright, learned, and discreet” and “habituated to the investigation of complicated 
masses of testimony, often contradictory, and often apparently so but really reconcilable.” Id. 
Elucidations from such a judge would be “of infinite utility to a conscientious jury in arriving at just 
conclusions.” Id. at 458. 
 13. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 248, 256. The system of review in common law 
courts was complicated, with King’s Bench exercising a special supervisory role. See J.H. BAKER, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 82-85, 135-54, 521-23 (4th ed. 2005); ROSCOE POUND, 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 57-60 (1941). American colonists associated the word 
“appeal” with equity and the prerogative courts. Mary S. Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 951-61 (1997). 
 14. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 STAT. 655. 
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1891 in other cases,
15
 and 1907 in England.
16
 These appeals were only for 
convictions; because of the double jeopardy rule, a verdict of acquittal was 
final. As will be seen, an important objection to appeals in criminal cases 
was the delay and uncertainty of outcome. Judges in both England and the 
United States protested that appeals in criminal cases would reduce the 
certainty and swiftness of punishment needed for effective deterrence. 
The common law courts tried to justify, or compensate for, the lack of 
appeal in various ways. These included: 
 The unanimity of the jury. Twelve of one’s peers had to agree on the 
verdict. 
 Comment on evidence by the trial judge to try to prevent the jury from 
going astray. 
 The prestige of the trial bench. In England, the highest common law 
judges traveled the circuits and served as trial judges.
17
 In the federal 
courts, Supreme Court justices rode circuit around the country and 
served as trial judges in the most important cases.
18
 
 The use of panels of judges in the first instance. This was not so much 
done in England except in treason cases,
19
 but it was relatively 
common in the United States. At first, the main federal trial courts, 
called the circuit courts, were set up to use three or two trial judges, at 
least one of whom was a Supreme Court justice.
20
 Various states used a 
similar model.
21
 
 Executive clemency, following a criminal conviction.22 
If review did occur and error was found, typically the remedy was the 
time-consuming and expensive new trial. The sources of error that could 
trigger a new trial grew over time, as judges converted what previously had 
been questions of fact into questions of law through ever-more elaborate 
jury instructions.
23
  The expense and delay of new trials encouraged 
 
 15. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 STAT. 826, 827–28. Many of the states established 
appellate review in criminal cases considerably earlier. See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN 
AMERICA 213-23 (1939). 
 16. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23. 
 17. See infra Part III.A.  
 18. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 19. See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 663–64. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 21. See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 111-15 (1940). 
 22. See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 626–28. 
 23. See id. at 448-50; Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations 
in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 542-53 (1996); Richard Danzig, 
Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 254-56, 272-
74 (1975). 
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judicial comment on the evidence and even stronger related forms of jury 
control such as directed verdict.
24
 The lack of thorough appeal and efficient 
remedy encouraged a procedure for jury control that in turn sometimes 
needed correction. Judges focused ever more on procedures and less on 
merit. This is a cycle familiar to historians of the common law.  
Contrast this situation with the nonadversarial systems of the Continent 
of Europe. The civil courts of Germany can serve as an example. In 
important cases, there may be a panel of judges in the first instance.
25
 The 
first appeal is to a court with separate personnel and is thorough on the 
merits. The standard is de novo review of both findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.
26
 Courts of appeal may find facts and enter a new 
judgment without remanding to the court below.
27
 
Gradually, the legal systems of the common law world began to correct 
their deficiencies concerning appeal. They slowly moved closer to the 
Continental model. The common law systems created courts of appeal with 
separate personnel and reduced technical restrictions—and eliminated some 
outright prohibitions—on appeals. The process is not complete; there is still 
deference to the court of first instance respecting factual findings, and cases 
are often remanded for new trial and other proceedings. Appeals, however, 
became more regular and thorough. 
The difficulty was that the common law systems retained the use of lay 
decision makers, the adversarial system, and single judges of the first 
instance. Appellate courts began to curtail the power of the trial judge over 
the jury and second-guessed judicial comments. As has been seen, judges 
and commentators have believed judicial comments were necessary to 
prevent confusion of lay jurors and improper influence of advocates. 
Because of more thorough appeals, trial judges increasingly refrained from 
thorough summing-up or comments, and juries were left to cope with the 
evidence and arguments of counsel without guidance. The trial judge 
operated as less of a check on the adversarial system. 
Previous studies of the history of comment on evidence have focused 
on the loss of the power in state courts. Kenneth Krasity emphasized 
mainly the period from 1835 to 1860 and attributed the loss of the power in 
many states to a growing importance of separation of functions between 
 
 24. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the 
Federal Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 459-60, 478-93 (2013) [hereinafter Lerner, 
Directed Verdict]. 
 25. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 850-51  
n.94 (1985).  
 26. Langbein, supra note 25, at  855-57. 
 27. Id. at 857. 
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judge and jury.
28
 In an earlier article, I stressed regional differences and 
highlighted the distinctive legal culture of the South and West, with its 
aggressive bar.
29
 Scholars have observed that the power of federal courts to 
comment on evidence was considerably stronger than that of many state 
courts.
30
 
This article emphasizes the development of courts of appeal with 
separate personnel in England and the federal courts. In both jurisdictions, 
this change was largely complete in the late nineteenth century. Trial 
judges lost prestige relative to appellate judges, and their powers to 
comment were limited. The gap between trial and appellate judges—and 
limitations on the power to comment—was more noticeable in the federal 
courts than in England. In both English and federal courts, the most 
dramatic limitations in the power to comment came after the development 
of appeals in criminal cases. 
In Part III, the article describes the strong judicial power to comment in 
England in the eighteenth century. The structure of English courts at the 
time—with trial judges reviewing cases—aided this power. As the 
adversarial system grew stronger, especially after 1836 when defense 
counsel in criminal cases gained the ability to make arguments to the jury,
31
 
the trial judges’ summing up was viewed as more pro-prosecution than it 
had been formerly. 
With the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875,
32
 England created appellate 
courts with largely separate personnel from those of the trial courts. 
However, the prestige of the trial bench remained strong, and its tenure is 
secure. Nearly all appellate judges in England were trial judges for a 
substantial period; England uses a promotional model. England has 
virtually eliminated jury trial for civil cases. In criminal cases, appeal as of 
right for convictions was not permitted until 1907.
33
 Even then, the Court 
of Criminal Appeal was at first staffed exclusively with trial judges. After 
1966, the appellate court used largely separate personnel,
34
 and restrictions 
on comment grew more significant. English judges regularly sum up the 
 
 28. Kenneth Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evaluation 
of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 595-96 (1985). 
 29. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 199-203 (2000). 
 30. See, e.g., SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, CHARGING THE JURY 65-66, 68-72 (St. Louis, William H. 
Stevenson 1880); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 
645-49 (2001). 
 31. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1. 
 32. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 
1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77. 
 33. Criminal Appeal Act 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23. 
 34. Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; Thomas, supra note 4. 
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evidence for the jury, and retain the power to comment on evidence today, 
although the power is less frequently used. 
The article then turns in Part IV to the power to comment on evidence 
in federal courts in the United States. Because of the circuit system, 
Supreme Court justices regularly sat as trial judges through the late 
nineteenth century. During this period the Court put few restrictions on 
judicial comment on evidence. Indeed, the Court held in many cases that 
judicial comment on fact was not reviewable at all.
35
 The Court rejected the 
idea that federal trial courts were bound by state laws and constitutional 
provisions restricting or prohibiting judicial comment on evidence. By the 
end of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth, the Court 
declared that the phrase “trial by jury” in the U.S. Constitution meant a trial 
in which a judge had the power to assist the jury with observations on 
fact.
36
 
The rule that the Supreme Court would not review a trial judge’s 
comments on fact changed after the Court began to hear appeals in capital 
criminal cases in 1889.
37
 The 1889 act was passed in large part to control 
one judge: Isaac C. Parker, U.S. district judge for the Western District of 
Arkansas. For many, Judge Parker represented the dangers of immense 
judicial power concentrated in one person, uncontrolled by review. Judge 
Parker’s district encompassed a large amount of Indian Territory, and there 
he had jurisdiction over all criminal cases committed by or against a non-
Indian. He was determined to create respect for law and order in his unruly 
district, and he presided over many capital trials and dozens of executions. 
Until 1889, none of the convictions was subject to appeal. 
After 1889, the Supreme Court reviewed almost fifty capital cases from 
Judge Parker’s court and reversed three dozen.38 Several of these reversals 
were significant because of the Court’s objections to Parker’s comments on 
fact to the jury. These cases were cited repeatedly in later decisions by the 
federal courts of appeals reversing convictions because of a trial court’s 
comments on evidence.
39
 The leading modern case on comment on 
evidence in the federal courts, Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 455 
(1933), draws heavily on the holdings of the Court’s cases reversing Judge 
Parker.   
 
 35. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 36. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 37. See infra Part IV.B. 
 38. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 39. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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III. ENGLAND 
A.  Structure of the Courts Through the Mid-Nineteenth Century and the 
Practice of Judicial Comment on Evidence 
At common law in England, every judge was both a trial judge and a 
member of a collegial court deciding questions of law. The basic structure 
of the English common law courts was established by the fourteenth 
century and endured until the Judicature Acts of the 1870s. The structure 
was not consciously designed, but grew gradually. Each judge of the three 
common law courts—Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and Exchequer—both 
presided over trials as a single judge and sat with his colleagues to hear 
initial pleadings and to decide post-trial motions and to enter judgment. 
When sitting collegially, each court functioned, in effect, as a court of 
appeal deciding questions of law.
40
 
In a civil case, a writ issued out of one of the common law courts at 
Westminster ordering a sheriff to summon a jury in the county where the 
events occurred. One of the common law judges—from any of the courts—
or an experienced member of the bar then presided over the trial, moving 
from town to town on a judicial circuit. A party could file post-trial 
motions, such as a motion for new trial, for the full court to decide, 
essentially as a court of appeal. This was called the nisi prius system 
because of the name of the writ informing a sheriff that a jury verdict 
would be taken in a case.
41
 
Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of King’s Bench in the late seventeenth 
century, described the advantages of the circuit system. The judges enjoyed 
close professional relationships while they sat together at Westminister 
Hall during the four law terms. This closeness during the terms carried 
benefits when the judges travelled the circuits. “[B]y this means their 
judgments and their administrations of common justice carry a consonancy, 
congruity and uniformity one to another, whereby both the laws and the 
administrations thereof are preserved from that confusion and disparity that 
would unavoidably ensue, if the administration was by several 
incommunicating hands, or by provincial establishments . . . .”42 
Centralized judges travelling out to the provinces maintained uniformity of 
law and practice. They also served as a direct reminder to the populace all 
over England of the power of the kingdom’s central authority over such 
crucial matters as serious crime and property rights. As the highest judges 
 
 40. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 256. 
 41. Id. at 123. 
 42. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 162 (Charles M. Gray, 
ed. 1971) (1713). This work was published posthumously; Hale died in 1676. 
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in the land, they carried great prestige wherever they went. The judgments 
of the courts were to be respected as a result. 
The judges of all the common law courts came together to discuss 
certain issues of law. For civil cases, the judges met in an institution known 
as Exchequer Chamber.
43
 By the mid-nineteenth century, the sittings of 
Exchequer Chamber were regularized, occurring after each law term.
44
 By 
this time, too, the principle of judges not sitting in appeal on cases they had 
decided below had taken hold. In Exchequer Chamber, therefore, errors and 
appeals from each common law court were heard only by the judges of the 
other two courts.
45
 
By the eighteenth century, the English bench enjoyed a reputation for 
competence and had considerable prestige. As there were few common law 
judges—between a dozen and fifteen at a time, for the entire nation—the 
power of any one judge was great, and so was his income. Leading 
members of the bar were eager to become judges. Furthermore, over the 
course of the eighteenth century, English judges attained a secure position 
of independence.
46
 
English judges routinely gave juries their opinion about the evidence in 
both civil and criminal cases.
47
 Matthew Hale explained that judicial 
comment on evidence was a vital aid to jury trial. He wrote that a judge not 
only directed the jurors on matters of law, but the practice of comment 
allowed the judge “in Matters of Fact, to give them a great Light and 
Assistance by his weighing the Evidence before them, and observing where 
the Question and Knot of the Business lies, and by showing them his 
Opinion even in Matter of Fact, which is a great Advantage and Light to 
Lay Men.”48 Based on study of a judge’s notebooks from the 1750s, John 
Langbein concluded that “the judge routinely dominated jury verdicts.”49 
 
 43. There was an analogous procedure for criminal cases, the case reserved, initiated solely at the 
discretion of the trial judge. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128. 
 44. Act of 1830, 11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV, c. 70. See First Report of the English Judicature 
Commission, 1869, reprinted in 5 MASS. L.Q. 254, 283 (1920). 
 45. Act of 1830, 11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV, c. 70; First Report of the English Judicature 
Commission, supra note 44.  
 46. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 655-57. 
 47. JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SPECIAL JURIES 12-13 (2006) (describing Mansfield’s comments to the jury in civil cases) [hereinafter 
OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY]; see also THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 139 
(1985); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 321-22 (2003) [hereinafter 
LANGBEIN, ORIGINS]; LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 431–36; 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE 
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 150, 
206 (1992) [hereinafter OLDHAM, MANSFIELD]; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law 
of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1193 (1996) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Evidence].  
 48. HALE, supra note 42, at 164-65. 
 49. Langbein, Evidence, supra note 47, at 1193. 
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“He guided the jurors to his views on the facts and the law, and he seems to 
have had an informal, conversational relationship with the jurors that 
allowed him to ‘turn up the heat’ if he thought the jury was inclining 
against his views.”50 James Oldham has written that although the 
eighteenth-century jury was not legally obliged to follow a judge’s 
direction, “trial judges did frequently direct juries to find for one party or 
the other, and juries ordinarily complied.”51 
The style and content of judicial comment varied widely. Lord 
Mansfield, Chief Justice of King’s Bench, was praised for presenting 
complicated cases to juries clearly and succinctly.
52
  Mansfield was known 
for his use of special juries of merchants in commercial cases.
53
 Together in 
a sort of partnership, Mansfield and these special jurors furthered the useful 
development of commercial law, especially insurance law.
54
 Mansfield’s 
successor, Lord Kenyon, held strong religious beliefs and declared them 
from the bench in certain cases. His comments to juries were especially 
powerful in actions for criminal conversation, a civil claim by a husband 
against his wife’s lover. According to The Times of London, in one such 
case in 1794, Howard v. Bingham, Kenyon deplored “the immorality of a 
libertine age” and told the jurors that one of his chief goals as a judge was 
to make “the law of the land subservient to the laws of morality and 
religion.”55 He said he found that “[j]uries co-operate with me” in that 
endeavor.
56
 Even so, Kenyon could be nuanced in his recommendations 
concerning damages in cases for criminal conversation.
57
 He expressed 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. OLDHAM, MANSFIELD, supra note 47, at 150. Mansfield told James Boswell that juries 
followed his direction “except in political causes where they do not at all keep themselves to right and 
wrong.” Id. at 206, (quoting 6 THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JAMES BOSWELL FROM MALAHIDE CASTLE 109 
(G. Scott & F.A. Pottle eds. 1928)). 
 52. OLDHAM, MANSFIELD, supra note 47, at 87. 
 53. OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 47, at 153. 
 54. Id. at 153-54; JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 20-22 
(2004). The use of special juries of merchants continued through the mid-nineteenth century. OLDHAM, 
TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 47, at 154-173; James Oldham, Jury Research in the English Reports in 
CD-ROM, in “THE DEAREST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND”: THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF 
THE COMMON LAW 134-44 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002). 
 55. Law Report, THE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1794, at 2 (reporting on the case of Howard v. Bingham). I 
owe the references to Kenyon to James Oldham. 
 56. Id. 
 57. “Causes of this kind have very different complexions, causes have come before me, where I 
have thought it incumbent on Juries to discharge plaintiffs with small damages. Causes of this kind have 
come before me, where I have thought the very cause of action failed, and therefore the plaintiff has 
been nonsuited. There have also been causes of this sort where Juries have given very large damages.” 
Id. There were occasional protests after Kenyon pressed the jury for large damages. One juror in 
another criminal conversation case before Lord Kenyon explained in a letter to The Times in 1798 that 
he had followed Kenyon’s instructions and awarded large damages, despite the juror’s doubts, only to 
have the verdict ridiculed afterward. A Juror, Letter to the Rt. Hon. Lord Kenyon, THE TIMES, Mar. 26, 
1798, at 3. 
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sympathy for the lovers as well as the husband in the unusual 
circumstances of Howard v. Bingham, and stated to the jury: “I should give 
damages, not merely nominal damages, but damages not to a very large 
amount.”58 The amount claimed was £10,000; the jury awarded £1,000.59 In 
another case of criminal conversation, Kenyon suggested to the jury that 
the conduct of the husband, in ignoring his young wife’s behavior as “an 
absolute strumpet, frequenting all the fashionable places of vice and 
dissipation,” should result in a verdict for the defendant.60 The jury gave a 
verdict for the plaintiff for 1s.
61
 
B.  The Elimination of Civil Jury Trial in England 
English judges’ power to comment on evidence played an important 
role in virtually eliminating the civil jury there, a process beginning in the 
mid-nineteenth century and extending into the twentieth. As Conor Hanly 
has explained, the English legal profession had confidence that English 
judges were on the whole impartial and competent.
62
 Members of the 
English legal profession and others also increasingly criticized jurors as 
incompetent to decide complicated disputes.
63 
As English judges already 
dominated juries thanks to judicial powers to sum up and to comment on 
evidence,
64
 it was a small additional step to eliminate juries and to save the 
trouble and expense. In 1850, The Times of London declared that in 99 
cases out of 100, the verdict turned more on the judge than the jury, and the 
“mere pantomimical expression of disgust or incredulity on the part of the 
presiding magistrate will be sufficient to neutralize the hypothesis of an 
advocate, or to shake the testimony of a witness,” as the jurors understand 
that “the Judge advocates the cause of truth alone.”65 
C.  Comment in Criminal Cases 
In criminal cases, although overt judicial comment on evidence became 
rarer, judges’ summing up remained important and became more elaborate. 
These changes seem to have been closely entwined with the advent and 
growing powers of defense counsel. John Langbein detected a shift in 
 
 58. Law Report, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Law Report, THE TIMES, June 21, 1799, at 3 (reporting on the case Henderson v. Tempest). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth Century England, 26 J. LEGAL 
HIST. 253, 255–58 (2005). 
 63. Hanly, supra note 62, at 261–62, 265. 
 64. Id. at 258–59. 
 65. THE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1850, at D4, quoted in Hanly, supra note 62, at 259. 
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attitude toward judicial comment in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, as defense counsel became more prevalent. “[T]he bench became 
more circumspect about advising juries on the merits.”66 Legal 
commentaries reflected this change, and some advised judges to refrain 
altogether from comment on the merits.
67
 
Judges, however, seem to have felt a growing need to sum up the 
evidence for the jury in detail. Again, this development arose in tandem 
with the increasing role of defense counsel. In the 1730s, defense counsel 
began to be permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
68
 and 
cross-examination by defense counsel took on greater importance as the 
eighteenth century progressed.
69
 The intensity of this cross-examination 
rendered the judge more passive during trial and trials more complicated.
70
 
More complicated cross-examination seems to have spurred judges to want 
to clarify testimony and issues for the jury at the end of the trial. The 
practice of detailed judicial summing up was well-established by the early 
nineteenth century.
71
 Although prosecution counsel, if there was any, 
described for the jury at the beginning of the trial what evidence he planned 
to introduce, before 1836 the only legal professional who spoke to the jury 
after the evidence was heard was the judge. 
Detailed judicial summing up would have become even more important 
because of another power of defense counsel. In a statute of 1836, often 
referred to as the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, defense counsel gained the right 
to address the jury in felony trials.
72
 The statute had a long legislative 
history, with extensive debates in Parliament from the early 1820s through 
the mid-1830s. Three modern scholars have addressed this history at 
 
 66. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 322. 
 67. Id. at 322-23. 
 68. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (1978). 
 69. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 291-96. 
 70. Id. at 313–14. David Wolchover has speculated that cross-examination may have encouraged 
judges to keep more careful notes during trial, to resolve clashes between counsel over what exactly a 
witness had said previously. These detailed notes would have facilitated judicial summing up of 
evidence for the jury. David Wolchover, Should Judges Sum Up on the Facts?, 1989 CRIM. L. R. 781, 
783. 
 71. In Parliamentary debates on the role of defense counsel, speakers on either side regularly 
referred to the judicial practice of summing up. See, e.g., 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 599 (Eng.) 
(statement of the Attorney General, John Copley) (“The evidence on both sides having been heard, the 
judge, not as counsel, as was erroneously supposed, for either the prisoner or the Crown, but placed 
where he was, impartially to administer justice, summed up, and taking a calm, dispassionate, and 
collected view of the case, and going regularly through the evidence, submitted it to the jury . . . .”); id. 
at 617 (statement of Mr. Tindal) (“[T]he facts were summed up by the judge, who left them to the jury 
in the most unbiased and unimpassioned manner.”); id. at 624 (statement of Mr. Scarlett) (“He agreed 
with his learned friend, that the administration of justice in this country was pure and unbiased; and he 
knew no picture more sublime, than that of chief baron Thompson, while engaged in unraveling the 
evidence, and stating the case to the jury.”). 
 72. Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1. 
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length.
73
 These scholars have tended to stress one argument of opponents of 
the measure: If defense counsel were permitted to address the jury, counsel 
for both sides would become more fiercely partisan and the truth would be 
lost, often to the detriment of the defendant.
74
 
Another important argument of opponents of the measure, however, 
concerned the behavior of judges. A significant objection to this statute was 
that the rhetoric of defense counsel, with possible misstatements of 
evidence, would provoke judicial remarks to the jury criticizing the defense 
and supporting the prosecution. These judicial remarks would often carry 
great weight with the jury. In the Parliamentary debates in 1826, several 
speakers opined that at that time, in the absence of defense counsel 
addressing the jury, judges were either neutral or favored the defense.
75
 
Some speakers claimed that such a judicial attitude would not be likely to 
survive the rhetoric of defense counsel. John Copley, the Attorney General, 
argued that the excesses of defense counsel might require the judge to 
comment disapprovingly, “and, in so doing, he would not be unlikely, in 
the heat of his address (for judges were but human), to create, however 
unintentionally, an impression unfavourable to the prisoner in the minds of 
the jury.”76 Robert Peel, then Home Secretary and a vigorous proponent of 
criminal law reform, particularly of reducing the number of capital 
offenses, agreed: “If counsel were allowed to address the jury in favour of 
the prisoner, the judges would feel and act on the trial differently from their 
present usual impartiality, and indulgence to the prisoner.”77 
The problem of judges appearing to favor the prosecution in an effort 
to counteract defense rhetoric concerned members of the bench and led 
many of them to oppose the measure.
78
 In 1834, Mr. Justice Park, an 
opponent of the measure, explained this difficulty: 
 
 73. DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 
1800-1865, 67-97 (1998); ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750–1850, 176-201 
(2003); John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIST. REV. 221, 250-58 (1991). 
 74. CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 69; MAY, supra note 73, at 178; Beattie, supra note 73, at 252–54. 
See also 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d. Ser.) (1826) 599 (Eng.) (statement of John Copley) (fearing that 
counsel would “convert the court into an arena . . . where, instead of endeavoring to elicit the truth by a 
reference to plain facts, or the real merits of the case, the time of the public would be wasted by contests 
between the counsel on either side, animated, as they would be, by all the excitement, zeal, and 
pertinacity, which such contests usually inspired”). 
 75. 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 601 (Eng.) (statement of the Attorney General, John 
Copley); id. at 606–07 (statement of Robert Peel); id. at 617 (statement of Mr. Tindal). See also 
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 112–13. 
 76. Id. at 601 (statement of John Copley). David Cairns has discussed this argument by Copley. 
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 69. 
 77. 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 606 (Eng.) (statement of Robert Peel).  
 78. CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 113-17. 
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If you have speeches for prisoners, you change immediately the 
nature of things; it is the duty of the judge to watch for the 
prisoner’s benefit, and take every objection for their benefit; 
instead of that, there will be some young gentleman making 
speeches, and talking of things quite extraneous, and that will turn 
the judge immediately into the prosecutor’s counsel, to prevent 
false topics being made use of to the defeat of justice.
79
 
The Act complicated the judicial task of summing up the evidence. In 
implementing the Act in 1837, the common law judges determined that 
prosecution counsel could reply following arguments by defense counsel, 
even if no evidence was introduced for the defendant.
80
 Judges therefore 
had to take into account in their summing up two speeches by opposing 
counsel after presentation of evidence. 
The concern about judicial remarks seeming to favor the prosecution 
proved prescient. Some English judges developed the reputation of 
summing up strongly in favor of the prosecution. In the most recent Bench 
Book, published in 2010, the Judicial Studies Board believed it necessary 
to warn judges against a one-sided summing up for the prosecution.
81
 
The practice of summing up became more directive over time, as 
judges moved from simply reading their trial notes in the early- and mid-
nineteenth century to marshalling the evidence in the late nineteenth 
century. The earlier practice was simply to read trial notes to the jury with 
minimal direction.
82
 In 1848, the author of a treatise criticized the “too 
common mode of summing up” by “many able, but somewhat lazy 
judges”: “’Gentlemen, if you think so and so, you will find for the plaintiff, 
if you think otherwise, you will find for the defendant; gentlemen, the 
 
 79. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE RECEIPT AND EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY RATES, REPORT, 1834, 
H.C. 14-I, at 143 (U.K.), quoted in CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 114-15. 
 80. MAY, supra note 73, at 199. 
 81. JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, CROWN COURT BENCH BOOK: DIRECTING THE JURY 6 (2010) 
(declaring, in a section entitled “Balance”: “A one-sided summing up is not likely to be a fair summing 
up. The judge is not required to ignore the fact, if it is the fact, that the defendant’s case appears to be at 
odds with the prevailing evidence, but it is not his job to support or to appear to support the prosecution 
at the expense of fair and independent consideration of the evidence by the jury.”). 
 82. Charles Dickens described this satirically as “the old-established and most approved form.” 
CHARLES DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, ch. 34 (1837). In the fictional case Bardell v. Pickwick, the trial 
judge “read as much of his notes to the jury as he could decipher on so short a notice, and made running 
comments on the evidence as he went along. If Mrs. Bardell were right, it was perfectly clear that Mr. 
Pickwick was wrong, and if they thought the evidence of Mrs. Cluppins worthy of credence they would 
believe it, and if they didn’t, why, they wouldn’t. If they were satisfied that a breach of promise of 
marriage had been committed, they would find for the plaintiff with such damages as they thought 
proper; and if, on the other hand, it appeared to them that no promise of marriage had ever been given, 
they would find for the defendant with no damages at all.” Id. Lord Devlin commented that Charles 
Dickens’s son, Sir Henry Dickens, stuck close to this model when he was on the bench. PATRICK 
DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 118 (3d ed. 1966). 
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question is for you.’”83 The author worried that, in complicated cases, this 
method of summing up “is almost tantamount, if not to a direct denial of 
justice, at least to a decision of the issue by lot.”84 To prevent juror 
confusion, writers recommended marshalling the evidence instead: 
describing the evidence to the jury not in the order in which it was given at 
trial, but as it pertained to each issue to be proved.
85
 Lord Alverstone, who 
was called to the bar in 1868 and elevated to the bench in 1900, explained 
that, before he went on the bench, the old practice of judges reading from 
their notes without arrangement began to give way to the practice of 
marshalling the evidence, and as a judge he followed the “new practice.”86 
Simply reading from trial notes, however, remained a tempting option for 
judges, as it involved less work than marshalling the evidence.
87
 
Authors observed that the summing up—aside from any obvious 
comment on evidence—could be highly influential with the jury. “Quite 
apart from any expression of opinion by the judge, the way in which he 
marshals the facts and gets rid of irrelevancies may present a strongly 
persuasive argument for one side or the other—and it must be remembered 
that it is the judge who has the real ‘last word’ with the jury.”88 Trial judges 
had widely varying styles of summing up and comment. Although 
 
 83. JOHN P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND 
AND IRELAND 28 (A. Maxwell & Son 1848). 
 84. TAYLOR, supra note 83. The writer recommended that a judge temperately state to the jury his 
opinion of the merits of the case, and the reasons for his opinion. The judge was no more liable to be 
prejudiced or partial than the jury, and his “long experience in courts of justice must, of necessity, have 
rendered him far more competent than they can be, to unravel the tangled threads of conflicting 
testimony.” Id. 
 85. Writers called this “predigesting” or “dissecting” the evidence. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 303 (3d ed. 1963) (“predigest”); 
DEVLIN, supra note 82 (“[A] jury probably finds some dissection of the evidence more helpful—
something which extracts the issue to be proved and segregates the material relating to each.”). 
 86. LORD ALVERSTONE [RICHARD WEBSTER], RECOLLECTIONS OF BAR AND BENCH 289 (1915). 
 87. See DEVLIN, supra note 82; Wolchover, supra note 70, at 784. In 1981, Lord Hailsham found it 
necessary to recommend “a correct but concise summary of the evidence and arguments on both sides” 
and observed that a “direction is seldom improved and may be considerably damaged by copious 
recitations from the total content of a judge’s note book.” R v. Lawrence, [1982] A.C. 510, 519 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
 88. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 304; see also DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 117 (“[I]t is obvious that 
they [the jury] are likely to be very much influenced by his [the judge’s] opinions on the facts and the 
way in which he presents them . . . .”); id. at 119 (discussing proposals that judges should be forbidden 
to comment on the evidence: “I doubt if this would achieve what the proposers want unless the judge 
was prohibited altogether from dealing with the evidence, for the mode of its presentation to the jury is 
likely to influence them just as much as any express comment.”); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 455 (1883) (“The mere effort to see what is essential to a 
story, in what order the important events happened, and in what relation they stand to each other must 
of necessity point to a conclusion. The act of stating for the jury the questions which they have to 
answer and of stating the evidence bearing on those questions and showing in what respects it is 
important generally goes a considerable way towards suggesting an answer to them, and if a judge does 
not do as much as this he does almost nothing.”). 
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“misdirection of fact” was a ground of appeal, its definition was vague.89 
The way in which the judge presented the defense was a special target on 
appeal. Even in presenting the defense, however, the trial judge was 
allowed a great deal of discretion.
90
 
As the practice of comment on evidence became rarer, the summing up 
became more salient. In the 1960s, Lord Devlin declared: “The summing-
up is a vital part of the jury trial.”91 
D.  Establishment of Trial Courts and Courts of Appeal  
with Separate Personnel 
Although England established an appellate court with separate 
personnel from the trial courts in the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875,
92
 the 
prestige and powers of the trial bench were not greatly affected. 
In consolidating the old courts into one Supreme Court of Judicature,
93
 
the 1873 Act divided the English judiciary into two permanent divisions: 
one called the High Court of Justice with mostly original jurisdiction, the 
other the Court of Appeal.
94
 The House of Lords remained the court of final 
appeal, but its judicial functions were transferred to a judicial committee.
95
 
In a break with previous practice, Parliament determined that the ordinary 
judges of the Court of Appeal should be separate from the ordinary trial 
judges.
96
 
There were two main reasons for having separate personnel in the 
Court of Appeal.
97
 First, and most important, was the goal of speeding up 
 
 89. Lord Devlin defined it as “anything which causes an appellate tribunal to think that the 
presentation of the facts was seriously unbalanced.” DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 117. 
 90. In a famous murder case in 1952, the judge’s summation of the prosecution’s case took up four 
or five pages in the transcript of the short hand note, but he devoted only one sentence to the defense, 
that the defendant denied the facts alleged against him. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 304 (describing the 
trial of Craig and Bentley). The Court of Appeal affirmed. Id.; see also id. at 304–05 n.69 (observing 
that the Court of Appeal had not been consistent in its treatment of the trial judge’s summing up of the 
defense). 
 91. DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 116. 
 92. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 
1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77. 
 93. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 3 (1873). 
 94. Id. § 4. 
 95. A statute of 2005 replaced the appeal committee of the House of Lords with a Supreme Court. 
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, 53 Eliz. 2, c. 4. The Supreme Court began operation in 2009. 
 96. The Court of Appeal consisted of various ex officio members and five ordinary members. Of 
the ex officio members, only the Master of the Rolls usually sat. R.J. WALKER & M.G. WALKER, THE 
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 91 (1967). The court usually sits in divisions of three judges. 
 97. I have not found discussion of any reasons in the existing secondary literature. 
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the administration of justice.
98
 English courts in the nineteenth century 
were under increasing pressure because of “a new class of business”: 
complicated litigation concerning railways and other joint stock 
companies.
99
 In the years leading up to the Judicature Acts, there were 
many complaints about the sluggishness and confusion of the system of 
post-verdict review and appeals.
100
 The First Report of the English 
Judicature Commission of 1869 and speakers in the Parliamentary debates 
in the 1870s emphasized the importance of an appellate court that sat 
continuously and so was able to decide cases faster.
101
 If trial judges were 
also to sit as appellate judges, as they did before the Acts, appellate court 
sittings would be interrupted while judges presided over trials. A separate, 
dedicated personnel was needed to handle appeals quickly. 
A second reason for separate personnel was doubt about whether an 
appeal could be efficacious if judges of the appellate court were the same 
as judges of the first instance. The principle was becoming established in 
English law that a judge should not hear an appeal if he had decided the 
case below. A different judge would be less attached to the result below 
and more likely to correct error. As discussed previously, by the mid-
nineteenth century the court of Exchequer Chamber had adopted this 
principle.
102
 The principle appeared in the Act of 1875, prohibiting a judge 
of the Court of Appeal from hearing an appeal from any judgment or order 
which he had made or was made by any division of the High Court of 
which he was currently a member.
103
 This concern to prevent judges from 
hearing appeals in cases they had decided below made it more desirable to 
separate trial from appellate personnel in order to maintain a speedy, 
efficient system. Having to constitute an appellate court by excluding 
 
 98. The members of the English Judicature Commission viewed it as their charge to make 
recommendations “to provide for the more speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of the judicial 
business.” First Report of the English Judicature Commission, supra note 43, at 254-55.  
 99. Id. at 258-59. 
100. See id. at 281–88; see also 214 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 349-56 (statement of the Lord 
Chancellor [Roundell Palmer, Lord Selborne] introducing the bill that became the Judicature Act of 
1873); 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 640-55 (statement of Mr. Charley); id. at 664 (statement of 
Mr. Osborne Morgan); id. at 673-75 (statement of Mr. James); id. at 681-83 (statement of the Solicitor 
General, William Vernon Harcourt); 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 861 (statement of Mr. 
Amphlett); 217 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 886-87 (July 24, 1873) (statement of Lord Hatherly). 
101. See First Report of the Judicature Commission, supra note 44, at 283 (arguing that the existing 
system, in which judges had too little time to hear appeals because of the pressing demands of presiding 
over trials and other responsibilities, was a “very serious” inconvenience); see also 216 PARL DEB., HC 
(3d ser.) (1873) 655 (statements of Mr. Charley and Mr. Amphlett); id. at 881 (statement of Mr. 
Williams) (“Now, the success of the new scheme was absolutely dependent upon having a speedy and 
economical appeal to a tribunal constantly at hand and continuously sitting.”). 
102. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
103. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, § 4. The latter situation could 
arise if the ex officio members of the Court of Appeal heard appeals, which normally they did not, 
except for the Master of the Rolls. 
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particular members for certain cases was an administrative nuisance and 
delayed appeals.
104
 In addition, the practice of trial judges reviewing each 
other’s decisions could lead to retaliation for reversals or cooperation in 
upholding decisions that would hinder proper correction of error.
105
 
Despite the creation of an appellate court with largely separate 
personnel from the trial court, there was no great difference of prestige 
between ordinary appellate and trial judges and no difference at all in 
salary. The salary of the ordinary judges of the Court of Appeal (styled 
Lords Justices of Appeal) was £5,000 apiece, exactly the same as the 
salaries of the ordinary judges of the trial courts (styled Judges of the High 
Court).
106
 Parliament had set the salary of £5,000 for the ordinary (puisne) 
common law judges in 1832,
107
 and the Judicature Acts simply continued it 
for both trial and appellate judges. This remained the salary for the two sets 
of judges until 1954, when Parliament raised them equally to £8,000.
108
 
Both types of judges continue to enjoy similar—and considerable—
dignitary distinctions. An appointment as a judge of the High Court brings 
with it a knighthood.
109
 Both sets of judges are referred to by the same title 
on the bench: “My Lord” or “My Lady.”110 
Gradually, appellate judges came to be more differentiated from trial 
judges, but the differences have not been great. For many years, a sort of 
fiction was maintained that there was hardly any distinction between 
 
104. The First Report of the Judicature Commission complained of this problem in the court of 
Exchequer Chamber. First Report of the Judicature Commission, supra note 44, at 283. 
105. See id. (expressing concern that trial judges who also sat as appellate judges might engage in 
retaliatory behavior: “[A]s the Judges of Appeal are not appointed or selected specially to act as such 
Judges, and the Judges who have been overruled to-day may to-morrow themselves sit in appeal from 
some decision of the Judges who have taken part in overruling them, [the situation] is eminently 
unsatisfactory.”). 
106. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 13. In 1873, one MP expressed 
concern that, after paying necessary expenses for staff and traveling circuit, the judges of the High 
Court would receive only £4,500. In his view, “it was not likely that the services of the best men of the 
Bar could be obtained for that low sum.” 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 1561 (statement of Mr. 
Henley). Lord Carnarvon agreed. “It must not be forgotten that parsimony in the matter of salaries paid 
to Judges meant a lowering of the whole judicial standard; because it was not to be expected that men of 
the highest character and legal ability would accept laborious duties with a niggardly scale of payment 
attached thereto.” 217 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 883 (statement of Lord Carvarvon). 
107. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 116 (1832). 
108. Judges’ Remuneration Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 27 (raising the judges’ salaries to £8,000). 
The Judges’ Remuneration Act, 1965, c. 61 further raised the judges’ salaries to £10,000. The 1965 Act 
allowed the pay of superior judges to be raised in the future by Order in Council, subject to the approval 
of both Houses of Parliament. Id. The Administration of Justice Act of 1973 repealed the Judges’ 
Remuneration Act and declared that judges’ salaries would be set by the Minister of Civil Service or by 
the Lord Chancellor. Administration of Justice Act, 1973, c. 15, § 9. 
109. By convention, there is a minor distinction in dignity between the Lords Justices of Appeal and 
the Justices of the High Court: The former are made members of the Privy Council, while the latter are 
not. The Lords Justices of Appeal are therefore entitled to the honorific “The Right Honorable.” 
110. PENNY DARBYSHIRE, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE WORKING LIVES OF JUDGES (2011). 
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appellate and trial judges. In 1933, a leading legal commentator asserted 
that High Court judges, already enjoying great prestige, did not look for 
promotion to the Court of Appeal, and the lack of difference in salary 
seemed to support that view.
111
 However, the difference between the top 
salaries at the bar and the static judicial salary of £5,000, first established in 
1832, continued to increase. In 1959, a prominent judge proclaimed in the 
House of Lords that the possibility of promotion from the High Court to the 
Court of Appeals was an inducement—and a necessary one—to service as 
a judge.
112
 A government report presented to Parliament in 1974 argued 
that, although the salaries of Lords Justices of Appeal and High Court 
Judges had always been the same, a difference was justified.
113
 
“[E]xceptional intellectual qualities are called for in a Lord Justice of 
Appeal, and appointment to the Court of Appeal from the High Court 
Bench is regarded as a promotion.”114 In recognition of the promotion, the 
report recommended a higher salary for appellate judges. The report, 
however, cautioned that the difference should not be large because of the 
inconvenience of the High Court judges’ circuit work.115 For 2015, the 
salary of the Lord Justices of Appeal is £202,668, and the salary of the 
judges of the High Court is £177,988.
116
 
Judges of the trial court have been appointed from barristers of 
considerable experience and high professional reputation,
117
 although this 
 
111. “It is a fair thing to say that when a man is appointed to the Supreme Court [the High Court] he 
does not look for promotion, but takes his job—with its high social status, its knighthood, its £5,000 a 
year, and its rather large quantum of leisure—as something final: an apex, not a ladder.”  R.C.K. 
ENSOR, COURTS & JUDGES IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ENGLAND 5 (1933). 
112. 220 PARL DEB., HL (5th ser.) (1959) 406 (statement of Lord Silkin) (“[I]n many cases, 
members of the Bar make a great sacrifice in becoming High Court Judges, and one of the 
inducements—and I think we ought to hold out inducements to them—is the opportunity which may 
arise of their becoming members of the Court of Appeal and Members of your Lordships’ House. . . . 
We have all known cases of barristers whose earnings have been £30,000 or £40,000 a year who have 
made the sacrifice and become Judges at £5,000 a year, as the salary now is.”). 
113. REVIEW BODY ON TOP SALARIES, REPORT NO. 6: REPORT ON TOP SALARIES, 1974-75, Cmnd. 
5846, at 93 (U.K.).  
114. Id. at 93; see also SHIMON SHETREET, JUDGES ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF THE APPOINTMENT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY 80 (1976). 
115. SHETREET, supra note 114, at 80.  
116. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Ministry of Justice Judicial Salaries from 1 April 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419123/judicial-salaries-
1-april-2015.pdf (last visited May 13, 2016). 
117. The Act of 1873 required that appointees to the High Court be barristers of not less than ten 
years’ standing. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 8. In 1959, Lord 
Goddard, former Chief Justice of England, told the U.S. National Conference on Judicial Selection and 
Court Administration that it would be “most unusual” for anyone of fewer than 20 to 25 years standing 
at the bar to be appointed a High Court judge. Lord Goddard [Rayner Goddard], Politics and the British 
Bench, 43 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 124, 125 (1959). Furthermore, such judges were usually chosen from 
among Queen’s Counsel, the senior rank at the bar whose members were “practically entirely engaged 
in the conduct of cases in court . . . .”  Id. 
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tradition may be changing. Since 2006, a fifteen-member Judicial 
Appointments Commission recommends candidates for appointment as 
High Court and Court of Appeal judges.
118
 Tenure for judges of the High 
Court and Court of Appeal is, as it has been for common law judges since 
1761,
119
 for life during good behavior.
120
 
A practice grew up, and endures to this day, of appointing members of 
the appellate court solely from judges of the trial court,
121
 and usually those 
of considerable experience. Members of the bar therefore cannot leap over 
the trial court directly to the appellate court and establish an immediate 
superiority. Commentators have observed that this practice has costs; some 
prominent members of the bar would leave practice to become appellate 
judges, but refuse to leave it to become trial judges.
122
 Nevertheless, the 
advantages of the system of promotion are thought to outweigh the costs. 
Trial judges are well respected, and appellate judges are deeply familiar 
with presiding over trials and can fashion rules accordingly. 
Despite the separation of trial judges from appellate judges, the English 
judiciary has continued its tradition of having a respected trial bench 
comparable in quality to the appellate bench. 
 
118. The Judicial Appointments Commission was created by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 
4, § 61. The act specifies that “[s]election must be solely on merit,” and that “[a] person must not be 
selected unless the selecting body is satisfied that he is of good character.” Id. § 63. The Commission 
“must have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for 
appointments.” Id. § 64. The Commission describes its application and selection process at JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION, Application and Selection, https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-and-
selection (last visited May 13, 2016). In 2015, the Judicial Appointments Commission announced a 
pilot program to train “women, those from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background and those 
‘from less advantaged social or educational backgrounds’” to prepare for selection as deputy high court 
judges. Owen Bowcott, High Court to Go on Recruitment Drive for “Non-traditional” Judges, THE 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/08/high-court-recruitment-driver-
non-traditional-judges. Deputy high court judges are expected to apply to become full-time high court 
judges. Id. Lady Justice Hallett, who announced the program, stated that candidates for deputy high 
court judge may have “little or no experience of attending or appearing in the high court—or any court 
for that matter.” Id. 
119. Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act, 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23. 
120. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 9 (“life”); Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, § 5 (“good behaviour”). Judges of the Court of Appeal and 
the High Court may be removed only with the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Id. 
121. See COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, Court of Appeal Judges, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-roles/judges/coa-
judges/ (last visited May 13, 2016) (“[T]he Lords Justices of Appeal . . . are selected from the ranks of 
the High Court Judges.”); HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THIRD REPORT JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
PROCEDURES, 1995-6, H.C. 52 (“Lords Justices of Appeal, who sit in the Appeal Courts, are invariably 
appointed on promotion from the ranks of High Court Judges.”). Since 1946, the judges of the Court of 
Appeal have been appointed exclusively from serving judges of the High Court, and there were few 
exceptions before then. GAVIN DREWRY, LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & CHARLES BLAKE, THE COURT OF 
APPEAL 111 (2007). 
122. DREWRY ET AL., supra note 121. 
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E.  The Special Situation of Criminal Appeals  
and Comment on Evidence 
The common law systems were especially slow to develop appeals in 
criminal cases.
123
 In England, the procedure of ordering a new trial, so 
freely used to correct jury and other error in civil cases, was not available 
in criminal cases. There was no way to correct an improper verdict of 
acquittal, if a jury insisted on it, because of the double jeopardy rule.
124
 If 
an improper conviction occurred, the trial judge could request executive 
clemency, and judicial requests were rarely denied.
125
 Until the twentieth 
century, the only way to correct an erroneous conviction within the court 
system was by reservation of the trial judge, and then only for errors of 
law. The trial judge reserved a point to be decided by all the judges 
together, an informal process that at first did not result in a formal 
judgment.
126
 The process became more regular, and in 1848 was formalized 
in a statute creating the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.
127
 Still, that court 
could only be invoked on reservation by the trial judge of a point of law, 
and was little-used.
128
 
Judges strongly resisted routine appeals in criminal cases. The judges’ 
reasons included concerns that there were not enough judges to staff a court 
of criminal appeals, and that a right of appeal by the defense should be 
matched by a corresponding right of the prosecution.
129
 The judges’ deepest 
worry, and that of other opponents of criminal appeals, was that appeals in 
criminal cases would cause delay and detract from the swiftness of 
punishment necessary to deterrence. Deterrence through swift and severe 
punishment was all the more important because England long lacked an 
effective police force.
130
 As Lord Hatherley, Lord Chancellor, put it in a 
debate in the House of Lords in 1870: 
All who have gone into the subject of punishment are agreed 
that to be effectual it should be speedy as well as certain, and 
nothing produces a greater effect on a criminal’s mind than to 
 
123. See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 702-05. 
124. Id. at 443-44. 
125. Id. at 626-28. 
126. James Oldham, Informal Lawmaking in England by the Twelve Judges in the Late Eighteenth 
and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 181, 191-99 (2011); Randall McGowen, Forgery 
and the Twelve Judges in Eighteenth-Century England, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 255-56 (2011). 
127. Phil Handler, The Court for Crown Cases Reserved, 1848-1908, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 
261-64 (2011); Benjamin L. Berger, Criminal Appeals as Jury Control: An Anglo-Canadian 
Perspective on the Rise of Criminal Appeals, 10 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2005). 
128. Berger, supra note 127, at 12. 
129. ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844–1994, at 23 (1996). 
130. Id. 
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find that, as sometimes happens, only a few days intervene 
between the commission of the crime and the trial, and only 
about a week between the latter and the execution. The terror 
caused by this speedy determination is one of the most 
effective means of impressing the criminal class. Now, this 
would be fatally interfered with if those desirous of 
interfering with a sentence had to apply to a tribunal for the 
purpose of re-hearing the case.
131
 
After two notable miscarriages of justice in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, public opinion strengthened in favor of a regular 
system of appeal to correct error.
132
 In 1907, Parliament created the Court 
of Criminal Appeal.
133
 
The Court of Criminal Appeal was highly unusual for the time because 
it was staffed with High Court judges from the King’s Bench division.134 In 
other words, the appellate court was staffed with the very judges who 
ordinarily heard criminal cases in the first instance. This was the model that 
Parliament had rejected for civil appeals in the Judicature Acts, as 
discussed above. It appears that judges, although they lost the fight to 
prevent a criminal court of appeal, won an appellate bench that likely 
would be more deferential to trial judges. Not until 1966 was the Court of 
Criminal Appeal made part of the Court of Appeal, and mainly staffed with 
a separate personnel of appellate judges, but even then, trial judges could 
and did regularly sit on the Court of Criminal Appeal.
135
 
Through the 1960s, trial judges were permitted wide latitude in making 
comments on evidence to the jury. Beginning in the 1990s, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal issued a series of decisions somewhat limiting the trial 
court’s discretion in commenting, although the power remains.136 
Currently in England, judicial summing up is expected and may be a 
ground for reversal if omitted,
137
 particularly in a complicated case.
138
 The 
judge must describe the defense,
139
 but may point out inconsistencies in the 
defense case.
140
 The most recent edition of the Bench Book from the 
 
131. 200 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) (1870) 1158. 
132. PATTENDEN, supra note 129, at 27-30. 
133. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23. 
134. PATTENDEN, supra note 129, at 34. 
135. Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; D. A. Thomas, The Criminal Appeal Act 1966, 30 M.L.R. 64, 64-
65 (1967). 
136. See, e.g., R v. Marr, (1990) 90 Crim. App. 154, 156; R v. Curtin, [1996] Crim LR 831, 832. 
137. R v. Berrada, (1990) 91 Crim. App. 131, 136; R v. Amado-Taylor, (2000) 2 Crim. App. 189. 
138. R v. Attfield, (1961) 45 Crim. App. 309, 313. 
139. Marr, 90 Crim. App. at 156. 
140. R v. Evans, (1990) 91 Crim. App. 173, 173. 
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Judicial Studies Board leaves large discretion to the trial judge, but 
cautions against simply summarizing the testimony in the order it was 
given at trial.
141
 English judges now appear regularly to use flow charts of 
necessary jury decisions—called decision trails or “routes-to-verdict”—to 
assist the jury in reaching a verdict.
142
 
English trial judges retain the power to comment overtly on the 
evidence, but exercise it less frequently than before.
143
 A case often cited in 
modern sources for the judicial power to comment dates from 1917, in 
which the trial judge described the defendant’s story as “a remarkable 
one.”144 Commentators in the 1960s asserted a strong judicial power to 
comment on evidence, though they suggested that it was not always 
used.
145
 In 1996, an appellate judge declared: “We do not doubt that the 
degree of adverse comment allowed today is substantially less than it was 
50 years ago.”146 As justification for the power to comment, judges and 
commentators emphasized, and continue to emphasize, the greater 
experience of the judge relative to lay jurors, and the tendency of jurors to 
be confused by the arguments of counsel.
147
 
  
 
141. JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, supra note 81, at 4 (“How to organise a summary of the evidence is 
a matter for individual judgement based upon the nature of the evidence and the issues in the case. 
Almost never will it be helpful or appropriate simply to summarise each witness in turn.”). The manual 
further states: “Brevity is a virtue, provided that essential matters are not thereby omitted. Essential 
matters are those which bear directly on the issues the jury has to determine. The judge is not obliged to 
repeat every byway taken by the evidence, but is entitled to assess what is important and what is 
peripheral.” Id. at 5. The Bench Book describes five different ways that evidence may be organized in 
the summing up. Id. 
142. Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So 
Differently from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 54-55 & n.123 (2013). 
143. See Marcus, supra note 142, at 24 n.72. 
144. R v. O’Donnell, (1917) 12 Crim. App. 219, 221. 
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 303-04 & n.67; DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 118 (“Some judges . . . 
will indicate an opinion on some of the issues or on the value of some pieces of evidence: unless it be in 
favour of the defence in a criminal trial it would be exceptional for the judge to put forward an opinion 
on the case as a whole. Nevertheless a judge is permitted to express his opinion freely and, if he wishes, 
strongly. The only limitation placed on him is that he must not put any point unfairly and must make it 
clear to the jury, either expressly or by implication, that on the issues of fact which are left to them they 
are free to give his opinion what weight they choose.”); WILLIAM R. CORNISH, THE JURY 123 (1968) 
(“The judge is free to comment as he likes on the strength of the case made out by either side 
. . . . The judge’s discretion in commenting upon the evidence is limited only in a minor degree.”). 
146. R v. Wood, (1996) 1 Crim. App. 207 (Staughton L.J.). 
147. R v. Cohen, (1990) 2 Crim. App. 197, 208; TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 28; Wolchover, supra 
note 70, at 788. One commentator, however, has argued that juries are sufficiently sophisticated, and 
counsel sufficiently clear and business-like, that judicial comment and summing up are unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous. Wolchover, supra note 70, at 788–92. 
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  The Federal Courts to the Late Nineteenth Century 
1.  Organization 
In 1789, the first Congress chose a structure for the federal courts 
largely resembling that of the English circuit system. The highest judges in 
the land, the justices of the Supreme Court, were to ride circuit and to sit 
regularly as trial judges. 
In the Judiciary Act of 1789,
148
 Congress created two types of federal 
trial courts: the district courts and the circuit courts. A separate federal 
district court was created for each state which had ratified the Constitution, 
and one district judge was authorized for each.
149
 Except for its grant of 
admiralty jurisdiction, the district court was conceived as “a very inferior 
court indeed.”150 The federal circuit courts, in contrast, were to have 
broader jurisdiction, including some appeals from the district court. 
Congress grouped the districts into three circuits: the Eastern, the Middle, 
and the Southern.
151
 Circuit courts were to sit twice a year in each district 
of the circuit. Each sitting of the circuit courts was to consist of two justices 
of the Supreme Court and the local district judge.
152
 The federal Supreme 
Court consisted of the Chief Justice and five associate justices.
153
 Given the 
composition of the circuit courts, the vast extent of the circuits, and the 
poor conditions of travel in the eighteenth century, the justices of the 
Supreme Court necessarily spent much of their time on circuit.
154
 
These arrangements were the result of extensive political 
compromise.
155
 Many of the political battles and positions that formed 
around the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 endured into the twentieth 
century. The Federalists wanted a strong federal judiciary, including lower 
courts, not beholden to the states but supporting national power and 
uniform legal rules throughout the country. Such a system, they believed, 
was conducive to commercial development; state courts and state 
 
148. 1 Stat. 73. 
149. Id. § 2. 
150. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 473 (1971). 
151. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 1. 
154. GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 553-54. 
155. For discussion of these battles and compromises, see 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 5, 10–17 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992); 
Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: 
The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609, 638–39 (2015). 
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legislatures (who at that time selected judges in most states) had proven 
eager to support debtors at the expense of creditors.
156
 The Anti-Federalists 
thought lower federal courts unnecessary and wanted to limit their 
jurisdiction and to tie them to the states, and local interests and rules, as 
much as possible. 
The Federalists succeeded in establishing federal trial courts, over the 
objections of the Anti-Federalists, but they paid a price. Federal question 
jurisdiction was largely left to the state courts. Federal district judges were 
tied to the states; they were required to be residents of their districts, 
coterminous with states.
157
 The Judiciary Act of 1789,
158
 and more 
specifically the Process Acts of 1789
159
 and 1792,
160
 required the federal 
courts to follow the “forms of writs and executions” and the “forms and 
modes of proceeding” of the state in which each court sat, if there was no 
federal statute on the subject.
161
 The required conformity was “static,” 
because it required conformity to state forms of proceeding as they existed 
in 1792.
162
 Because Supreme Court justices, when they held circuit courts, 
could not be expected to know the details of state practice, the district 
judge was there to help them.
163
 
Supreme Court justices were kept busy running around the country on 
circuit. Members of both parties saw advantages in this system. There were 
many reasons for Congress’s attraction to the circuit system.164 First was 
the desire to save money by making members of the federal bench do 
double duty as trial and appellate judges. As in England, the effect was to 
slow down the administration of justice.
165
 Second, travelling around the 
country hearing trials would expose federal justices to state laws and 
practice, and keep them directly in contact with juries. Third, being visited 
regularly by the highest judges of the federal bench would hopefully 
 
156. Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 497–99 
(1928); John Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 
25 (1948). 
157. Judiciary Act of 1789 §3. 
158. Id. §§ 14, 34. 
159. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1792). 
160. Act of May 8, 1792, c. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275 (repealed 1872). 
161. Id. The Process Acts have not been much noticed by historians of the federal courts, until 
recently. For an extensive discussion of the relevant provisions of the Judiciary Act and the Process 
Acts, see Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 627–55. See also 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
155, at 112–13; GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 509–10. 
162. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 655. 
163. Id. 
164. See Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1757-61 (2003). 
165. RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 7–8 
(3d ed. 2005). 
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impress citizens favorably toward the national government.
166
 Fourth, if 
trials were conducted by such a prestigious bench, the judgments of the 
federal courts would likely be more respected and authoritative. This was 
especially important in criminal cases, in which there was no appeal. Fifth, 
there was the advantage that Matthew Hale described for the English circuit 
system: maintaining uniformity of legal rules throughout the country. 
For justices, the hardships of riding circuit far outweighed these 
advantages. The justices complained bitterly about the duty from the 
beginning. The federal circuits required travel over vast distances: 1,900 
miles for the Southern Circuit, the longest.
167
 Justices had to cope with 
overturned coaches, runaway horses and vehicle crashes, near drownings in 
flooding rivers, frozen river crossings,
 168
 and “rascally” inns.169 Justice 
James Iredell was so appalled that his colleagues assigned him to ride the 
Southern Circuit in perpetuity that by his own account he was struck 
speechless.
170
 He recovered enough to address a written remonstrance to his 
brethren: “I will venture to say no Judge can conscientiously undertake to 
ride the Southern Circuit constantly, and perform the other parts of his 
duty.”171 The indignant Iredell, with the help of his brother-in-law Senator 
Samuel Johnston, persuaded Congress in 1792 to require the justices to 
rotate circuits.
172
 Several distinguished lawyers declined or resigned 
appointments to the Court because of the rigors of circuit riding.
173
 
The justices reported another problem with circuit riding, one familiar 
from the English debates in the mid-nineteenth century: the administrative 
difficulties caused by the desire to prevent a judge from hearing an appeal 
of a case he had decided below. The Judiciary Act of 1789 specified that 
district judges, when they sat on circuit courts, should not vote on appeals 
from cases they had decided below.
174
 There was, however, no similar 
prohibition on Supreme Court justices hearing appeals of cases they had 
 
166. Justices used their charges to grand juries to teach citizens about the federal government and 
their duties in a republic. 2 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-
1800, at 5–6 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican 
Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127. 
167. GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 557. 
168. Id. at 569 & n.79. 
169. James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early 
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 n.120 (2008). 
170. Letter from James Iredell to John Jay et al. (Feb. 11, 1791) in 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 322 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) . 
171. Id. at 324. 
172. Act of Apr. 13, 1792, c. 21, 1 Stat. 252. On this act, see Pfander, supra note 169, at 28–31.  
173. GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 553–54. 
174. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4. 
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decided as circuit judges.
175
 The justices protested to Congress that they 
sometimes were required to “correct in one capacity the errors which they 
themselves may have committed in another . . . a distinction unfriendly to 
impartial justice.”176 To solve this problem, the justices agreed among 
themselves that they would not vote on appeals from their own decisions 
except in the case of a split vote.
177
 Critics of the system of circuit riding 
continued to raise the issue of a justice hearing an appeal from his own 
decision.
178
 
Congress initially was unsympathetic to the justices’ plight. The 
justices were considered to be well-paid compared to state court judges,
179
 
partly in order to offset the expense of riding the long circuits.
180
 There was 
no separate appropriation to cover the justices’ travel expenses, and there 
remained none during the whole period that justices traveled circuit. Failure 
to reimburse travel expenses, apart from the justices’ salaries, hardly 
encouraged the justices to travel circuit. 
In such a large and growing country, regular circuit riding by justices 
of a central court proved unworkable in any case. Congress gradually 
diminished the justices’ circuit-riding responsibilities.181 Also of great 
importance was the related continuing decay of the circuit court as a panel 
 
175. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention 
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1505 (describing the failure of the Act to contain this 
prohibition). 
176. WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 165 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Congress 
(Nov. 7, 1792) in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS MISCELLANEOUS 51-52 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 
1834)). 
177. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256 n.* (1796), Justice Iredell explained the practice. 
178. In 1861, Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire gave a floor speech criticizing circuit riding. 
“I think that the Supreme Court of the United States in its very organization has a radical and fatal error, 
one that we inherited from the British constitution.” Judges should not review their own decisions on 
appeal, because they “look on those cases as their own children, that they are bound to take care of 
when they come up to be reviewed on the bench.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 26–28 (1861). 
Hale urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to look abroad, and to “see the judicial progress that some 
of the best minds of England have been laboring for a long while to accomplish, without effecting a 
great deal, though they have done something . . . .” Id. at 28. 
179. GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 568 & n.71. 
180. Pfander, supra note169, at 19–24. Pfander observes that any reduction in circuit riding was in 
effect a salary increase for the justices, which helps to explain their implacable opposition to riding 
circuit. Id. at 33–34. 
181. In 1793, Congress reduced from two to one the number of justices needed to hold a circuit 
court. Judiciary Act of 1793, c. 22, 1 Stat. 333. In 1801, the Federalists enacted a law that established 
six circuits, each with a newly created circuit court judgeship, and ended the Supreme Court justices’ 
circuit riding. Judiciary Act of 1801, c. 4, 2 Stat. 89. The Jeffersonian Republicans quickly repealed the 
act in 1802 and substituted a new one that abolished the circuit judgeships and again required justices to 
ride circuit, but retained the six circuits. Judiciary Act of 1802, c. 31, 2 Stat. 156. The Judiciary Act of 
1802 assigned to each circuit the Supreme Court justice “residing within” the circuit, the distribution of 
circuits to be worked out by the justices. Id. §§ 4–5. The circuit courts were to be held by the Supreme 
Court justice residing within the circuit and the district judge, sitting together as a panel. 
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of judges.
182
 Slowly over the nineteenth century, the seeming exception 
became the rule. More and more, the district judges held circuit court 
alone.
183
 Not only did this situation leave important questions to be decided 
by a single judge in the first instance, it diminished the possibility of 
appeal. In case of a disagreement between two judges sitting together as a 
circuit court, the point of disagreement was to be stated and certified for 
decision by the Supreme Court.
184
 If there was only one judge, no 
disagreement was possible and thus no appeal on that basis. 
The situation of the main federal trial court being held by a single 
judge does not seem so dire to us today; that is a feature of the current 
federal system. In the nineteenth century, the lack of access to appeal—
characteristic of common law systems—made the situation especially 
dangerous. There was no intermediate court of appeal in the federal system 
until the end of the nineteenth century. Any appeals from the circuit courts 
had to go to the Supreme Court, with its limited capacity. Even more 
important, many cases in the circuit court were not subject to review at all. 
These included civil matters involving less than $2,000, and all criminal 
cases, except if there was a division of the court.
185
 Federal legislators were 
concerned. Executive clemency was a remedy, but some viewed it as 
insufficient to cure the lack of appeal in criminal cases. In 1829, a report of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee complained of the problem of a single 
district judge in the circuit court hearing civil cases,
186
 and observed: “The 
 
182. Buried in the Act of 1802, in the lengthy fourth section, in the middle of a seemingly routine 
paragraph on the constitution of the sixth circuit, appeared language allowing a circuit court to be held 
by a district judge sitting alone. Id. § 4 (“provided, that when only one of the judges hereby directed to 
hold the circuit courts, shall attend, such circuit court may be held by the judge so attending”). The 
importance of the provision was perhaps not immediately evident. The provision may simply have been 
intended to cover situations in which the justice for the circuit was unavoidably delayed in travel, or in 
which a justice or district judge was ill, or had died and had not yet been replaced. This last scenario 
occurred in the third circuit with the death of Justice William Paterson in 1806, and in 1808 litigants 
challenged a judgment of the circuit court because it was held by the district judge alone. Chief Justice 
John Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, brusquely rejected the challenge based on the provision 
of the Act. Pollard & Pickett v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 429 (1808). 
183. See infra text accompanying notes 186-192. In part, this was because Congress diminished the 
Supreme Court justices’ circuit travel requirements. In 1844, Congress required Supreme Court justices 
to visit their circuits only once a year, although the circuits had two terms a year. Act of June 17, 1844, 
c. 96, 5 Stat. 676. The growing number of states and expansion of U.S. territory, together with rising 
caseloads, strained the federal court structure. Congress created new circuits and added a new Supreme 
Court justice for each. In the process, new states were often left for some time outside a circuit and 
without a justice, and district judges in those places necessarily exercised the full federal jurisdiction 
alone. 
184. Judiciary Act of 1802, c. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156. 
185. S. DOC. NO. 20-50, at 5 (1829). On the lack of review of criminal cases in England, see 
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 702–05. 
186. S. DOC. NO. 20-50, supra note 185. The report explained that in situations in which a district 
judge alone holds circuit court, “[h]is single opinion is decisive of the controversy in every matter of 
law. If the amount exceed two thousand dollars, the party who can sustain the expense of prosecuting an 
appeal, or writ of error, may indeed have his cause reviewed by the Supreme tribunal—but every suitor 
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evil is more striking in criminal cases. The fiat of an individual, which 
dooms the accused to imprisonment, or to death, is irresistible, irreversible. 
No appeal is allowed—no writ of error provided by law; and, from the 
constitution of the Court, no disagreement can arise to invoke the 
protective interposition of the supreme tribunal.”187 
Even Abraham Lincoln’s powerful critique of the federal court system 
in his first annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1861,
188
 
together with the creation of circuit judges in 1869,
189
 failed to solve 
adequately the twin problems of single judges presiding over important 
cases and lack of appellate review. The new circuit judges spent a great 
deal of time traveling around their large circuits.
190
 In 1889, the author of a 
paper presented at the American Bar Association’s annual meeting 
described the circuit judge: “The only thing he can do is to exercise his 
jurisdiction in a few spots here and there. He wings his flight across a broad 
expanse and dips down in a few favored localities.”191 The author claimed 
that at that time, eight-ninths of the cases in the circuit courts were 
disposed of by single judges, mostly district judges.
192
 
Federal caseloads and backlogs continued to grow. Not only were the 
population and commercial activity increasing, but after the Civil War 
Congress greatly expanded federal jurisdiction. In 1875, Congress passed 
two important and related statutes within two days of each other: the Civil 
Rights Act
193
 and the Judiciary Act.
194
 The latter fulfilled the Federalist 
dream of granting general federal question jurisdiction to the federal trial 
courts. With these acts, the Republicans helped realize their goals of full 
 
cannot sustain this expense, and to him the doom is final. In many instances, too, the counsels of an 
Associate would probably have changed the result, and have rendered this appeal unnecessary; and in 
those cases, where, from the smallness of the amount in controversy, the right of appeal is not allowed, 
the injury resulting from the error of this single Judge, is remediless.” Id. 
187. Id. 
188. In his first annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1861, President Lincoln—
although he had other issues to discuss—thought it important to observe that “the country generally has 
outgrown our present judicial system” and to propose solutions. Message to Congress of Dec. 3, 1861, 
in 5 THE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 41 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). He explained that the circuit 
system as originally designed no longer functioned adequately, and that eight recently admitted states 
had never had circuit courts attended by Supreme Court justices. Id. at 41-42. His recommendations 
included limiting the number of Supreme Court justices, regardless of the number of circuits, and then 
adding separate circuit judges. Id. at 42. 
189. Congress created nine circuit judgeships, one for each circuit. In the same act, Congress 
reduced the requirement of Supreme Court justices visiting their circuits to once every two years. Act of 
Apr. 10, 1869, c. 22, 16 Stat. 44. On the passage of this act, see Glick, supra note 164, at 1815-1817. 
190. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 62–63 (2d ed. 2002). The circuit 
judges spent time hearing appeals from the district courts in admiralty cases, appointing receivers in 
equity cases, and appointing other judges to serve for district judges who were ill or incapacitated. Id. 
191. Walter B. Hill, The Federal Judicial System, 12 A.B.A. Rep. 289, 302 (1889). 
192. Id. at 304. 
193. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, c. 114, 18 Stat. 335. 
194. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470. 
33_LERNER_JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  10:07 AM 
248 The Journal of the Legal Profession [Vol. 40:2 
rights of citizenship for freedmen and a robust national market with unified 
legal rules. As a result, however, in the late nineteenth century the federal 
courts became clogged, and appeals in particular slowed tremendously. 
Appeals brought to the Supreme Court took years to decide. Decisions of 
federal trial courts were often for practical purposes unreviewable.
195
 The 
appellate docket of the Supreme Court, which was mandatory, became so 
crowded that justices sometimes determined they could not travel their 
circuits.
196
 By the 1880s, several justices refused to travel their circuits 
altogether.
197
 
There were sharply differing opinions about how to solve the problem, 
echoing the earlier debates over the federal judiciary between Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists. Some, particularly well-represented in the Senate, 
wanted to preserve the expanded federal jurisdiction and to speed up the 
administration of justice in the federal courts by creating an intermediate 
court of appeals with separate personnel.
198
 They worried about prejudice 
against corporations in state courts and the safety of capital, which they 
viewed as threatened by populist enactments of state legislatures.
199
 Others, 
with strength in the House of Representatives and the South and West, 
opposed the creation of an intermediate court of appeals and wanted to 
restrict federal jurisdiction instead.
200
 In their view, the expansion of 
federal jurisdiction after the Civil War was anomalous and should be 
reversed. They complained that the federal courts favored commercial 
interests and were too willing to overturn state laws.
201
 
A significant concern of advocates for an intermediate court of appeals 
was the problems caused by single district judges holding circuit courts. 
The lack of review, or effective review, led to a potential “judicial 
 
195. WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 165, at 16. 
196. Glick, supra note 164, at 1818. 
197. Id. at 1824. Congress’s consistent failure to appropriate money for the justices’ travel expenses 
on circuit remained a reason for justices to avoid the duty when they could. Some justices and other 
federal judges accepted free railroad passes, presumably for this reason, although railroads were 
frequent litigants in federal courts. See id. at 1814–15; 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 541–48 (1971). 
198. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 91–92 (1928); 
Daniel S. Holt, The Abolition of Federal Circuit Courts and the Course of Judicial Reform in the Early 
Twentieth Century 7 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file with the author); Howard Gillman, How 
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 
1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002). Proponents of intermediate courts of appeals argued 
that a panel of judges on appeal could take the place of a panel of judges in the first instance. George 
W. McCrary, Needs of the Federal Judiciary, 13 CENT. L.J. 167 (1881) [hereinafter McCrary, Needs of 
the Federal Judiciary]. The key was to prevent a decision by a single judge which was effectively 
unreviewable, leading to a “judicial despotism.” George W. McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary, 2 CENT. 
L.J. 551 (1875) [hereinafter McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary]. 
199. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 91-92. 
200. Id. at 82–85; Holt, supra note 198; Gillman, supra note 198, at 520. 
201. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 85. 
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despotism.”202 A circuit judge, formerly a member of the House of 
Representatives who had called for creation of an intermediate court of 
appeals, emphasized in an article in 1881 that circuit courts had been 
established on the principle that important classes of cases were to be 
decided by panels of judges. He stressed the importance of deciding 
questions of law, but his argument also applied to questions of fact. He 
explained: 
The value of discussion, and a comparison of views by judges in 
conference, can hardly be overestimated. The Federal judicial 
system is based upon the theory that the concurrence of two judges 
in the judgment of the circuit courts in important cases is desirable; 
or that in case of a difference of opinion, while the view of the 
presiding judge shall prevail, the case . . . may go to the Supreme 
Court.
203
 
2.  Judicial Comment: Broad Discretion  
in the First Hundred Years 
In the early nineteenth century, decisions of the Supreme Court gave 
trial courts—which often at the time included the justices themselves—
large discretion to comment on facts to the jury. The Court declared that it 
would not even review such questions on writ of error, virtually the only 
form of appeal allowed. Justice Joseph Story authored many of the early 
opinions.
204
 Story did urge trial judges to take care to separate the law from 
the facts, and to make sure that the jury understood that the latter were for 
them to decide.
205
 Otherwise, the Supreme Court left the matter to the trial 
judges’ discretion. 
In several of the cases, Story expressed impatience with the growing 
practice of counsel to put the whole charge of the trial court to the jury on 
the record, and to object to every part of it.
206
 The Court announced its 
“decided disapprobation” of the practice, and declared it to be 
 
202. McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary, supra note 198, at 551. 
203. McCrary, Needs of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 198, at 169. 
204. See, e.g., McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 182 (1828) (Story, J.) (“It is, 
doubtless, within the province of a Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to sum up the facts in the case 
to the jury, and submit them, with the inferences of law deducible therefrom, to the free judgment of the 
jury.”); Carver v. Jackson ex rel. Astor, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 4 (1830) (Story, J.); Magniac v. Thomson, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 348, 390 (1833) (Story, J.); see also Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95–96 
(1836) (McLean, J.); Games v. Stiles ex rel. Dunn, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 322, 327 (1840) (McLean, J.). 
205. McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 182 (reversing a judgment in which the trial court instructed 
the jury “‘that upon the whole evidence in the case’ the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, and the 
verdict of the jury ‘ought to be for the defendants’”). 
206. Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4; Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390. 
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“unauthorized” and “extremely inconvenient both to the inferior and to the 
appellate court.”207 The reason was that the trial judge’s charge often 
included observations on matters of fact. Story firmly declared, “With the 
charge of the court to the jury, upon mere matters of fact, and with its 
commentaries upon the weight of the evidence, this court has nothing to 
do.”208 If the trial court gave a misdirection on a matter of law, that was 
different, and could properly be pointed out and objected to.
209
 The 
Supreme Court, however, would not trammel the trial court’s commentary 
on matters of fact, so long as the issue was left to the jury.
210
 Story 
suggested that the possibility of such comments being reviewed was greater 
in England, because of the practice there of reviewing a motion for a new 
trial before the full court.
211
 In the federal courts, in contrast, motions for 
new trial were addressed to the trial court only and could not be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court on writ of error.
212
 
The Supreme Court repeatedly declared, through the late nineteenth 
century, that it would not review a trial judge’s comments on fact.213 The 
most ringing statement of this rule came in 1886, probably inspired by the 
growing gulf in practice between the state and federal courts: 
In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from 
which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to 
the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to 
assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the 
evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks 
 
207. Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4; accord Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390. 
208. Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4 (“Observations of that nature are understood to be addressed to 
the jury, merely for their consideration, as the ultimate judges of matters of fact; and are entitled to no 
more weight or importance, than the jury in the exercise of their own judgment choose to give them. 
They neither are, nor are they understood to be, binding upon them, as the true and conclusive 
exposition of the evidence.”); accord Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390. 
209. Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4. 
210. Chief Justice Taney described a limited exception in a case in 1857: A trial judge could not 
charge a jury “upon a supposed or conjectural state of facts, of which no evidence has been offered.” 
United States v. Breitling, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 252, 254–55 (1857). In that case, the trial court, at the 
request of defendant’s counsel, charged the jury that they should find for the defendant if, at the time 
defendant signed a bond, it was understood that other persons would sign the bond as obligors, but they 
did not. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence that other persons were supposed to sign the 
bond. Id. at 253, 255. Such a charge, the Court stated, “does not aid them [the jurors] in coming to 
correct conclusions, but its tendency is to embarrass and mislead them. It may induce them to indulge in 
conjectures, instead of weighing the testimony.” Id. at 255. See also Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 76 
U.S. (9 Wall.) 544, 553–54 (1869) (following Breitling). For several further examples of federal judges 
commenting on evidence, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 30, at 646 n.235, 647 n.243. 
211. McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 189-91. 
212. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 301 (1876) (citing cases). 
213. See, e.g., Transp. Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 302 (1877) (“An expression of opinion simply by 
a judge upon a question of fact is not a ground of error.”) (citing New York cases); Vicksburg & M.R. 
Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553-54 (1886). 
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important, and express his opinion upon the facts; and the 
expression of such an opinion, when no rule of law is incorrectly 
stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the 
determination of the jury, cannot be reviewed on writ of error.
214
 
3.  The Effects of Differing State Practices 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the practice of judicial 
comment on evidence in federal and state courts increasingly diverged. As 
I and other scholars have described, many states limited or prohibited the 
trial judge’s power to comment.215 During the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the Supreme Court did not mention different state practices with 
respect to summing up or comment on evidence. The Court cited English 
cases—particularly those of Lord Mansfield—and New York cases.216 New 
York had a robust practice of judicial comment on evidence. 
After mid-century, the Court began to take more notice of differences. 
In the 1851 case Mitchell v. Harmony, Chief Justice Roger Taney, a 
Jacksonian Democrat when he went on the Court and a supporter of states’ 
rights, observed that, in some of the states, judges did not sum up or 
comment on evidence.
217
 Most of the states at the time continued to follow 
“the usages of the English courts of justice,” in which the judge always 
summed up the evidence and could comment on it. He refused to declare 
which practice was preferable, but recommended that federal courts follow 
the practice of the state in which they sat.
218
 He cited Story’s opinions, and 
the Court upheld the trial judge’s comments in the case, which were made 
when the circuit court was sitting in New York.
219
 
The question of differing state court practices grew more intense after 
1872, with the passage of the federal Conformity Act.
220
 As explained 
previously, the Process Act of 1792 required federal trial courts to follow 
the forms and modes of proceeding of the state in which they sat, as the 
 
214. Vicksburg, 118 U.S. at 553. In Vicksburg, the federal Circuit Court in Georgia commented on 
evidence in a manner unfavorable to the defendant, a railroad in a personal injury case. See also United 
States v. Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887) (paraphrasing and citing Vicksburg); 
Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U.S. 85, 93 (1888) (quoting Vicksburg); Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U.S. 
171, 173 (1888) (citing Rucker); California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U.S. 387, 417 (1890); 
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891). 
215. See supra notes 28-30. 
216. See, e.g., McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 189-91 (citing opinions by Mansfield and James 
Kent). 
217. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 130-31 (1851). 
218. Id. at 131. 
219. Id. at 130 (“This mode of charging the jury has always prevailed in the State of New York, and 
has been followed in the Circuit Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution.”). 
220. Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, 17 Stat. 196. 
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practices existed in 1792. The federal courts adhered to traditional common 
law pleadings and practice. With the advent in many states of codes of civil 
procedure simplifying pleading and merging law and equity, the bar was 
faced with the necessity of learning two different systems of pleading to 
practice in both federal and state courts. To prevent this difficulty, 
Congress enacted the Conformity Act, specifying that “the practice, 
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” in federal trial courts in 
civil cases, other than equity and admiralty cases, “shall conform as near as 
may be” to those of state courts in the state in which they sat.221 
The Court was soon faced with the question whether, under the 
Conformity Act, federal trial courts had to follow state rules prohibiting 
judicial summing up or comment on evidence. In 1875, months after the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the Judiciary Act, as Republicans 
were expanding federal jurisdiction and seeking a strong national judiciary, 
the Court gave a powerful answer.
222
 “The personal conduct and 
administration of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions” was 
not a practice, pleading, form, or mode of proceeding under the Act.
223
 The 
Act was simply intended to have the federal courts follow the code 
pleading of the states in which they sat, when practicable. The Act did not 
require federal trial judges to follow state laws limiting their power to 
comment on evidence. The Court’s opinion went further and suggested it 
might not be possible for Congress to limit the trial judge’s power to 
comment, even if that was its intent. If the legislature had tried to limit the 
judge in this respect, “the powers of the judge, as defined by the common 
law, were largely trenched upon.”224 The Court warned, “There are certain 
powers inherent in the judicial office.”225 These stern statements were far 
from the more state-centered views of the Court in the 1850s. In the 1870s, 
the Supreme Court made it possible for federal courts to assert control over 
juries, and by extension, counsel. 
At the same time as the justices were confirming the power of federal 
trial judges to comment on evidence under the Conformity Act, they were 
strengthening the ability of those judges to engage in an extreme form of 
 
221. Id. § 5; see Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 655–56; Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 
(1875). 
222. Nudd, 91 U.S. at 441–42. 
223. Id. at 442. Citing Nudd v. Burrows, the Court the next year rejected a demand that the federal 
trial court administer special interrogatories to a jury after a general verdict, following state law. Horst, 
93 U.S. at 299-301. In Horst, the demand was made by counsel for the defendant, a railroad, in a 
personal injury case involving allegations of contributory negligence. The Court’s decisions concerning 
the Conformity Act did not always favor railroads. See also St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Vickers, 
122 U.S. 360, 363 (1887) (citing Nudd in holding that state law cannot prohibit a federal judge from 
commenting on evidence). 
224. Nudd, 91 U.S. at 442. 
225. Id. 
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comment: directed verdict. In a previous article, I discussed growing use of 
the directed verdict procedure in the nineteenth century to combat the 
perceived bias of juries, and to promote predictability in the law.
226
 The 
Supreme Court emphasized the need for federal trial judges to control 
juries: “It is the duty of the court in relation to the jury to protect parties 
from unjust verdicts arising from ignorance of the rules of law and of 
evidence, from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from any other violation 
of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial.”227 Directed verdicts spared the 
necessity of the expensive and time-consuming remedy of new trial.
228
 
Comment on evidence, many hoped, would have some of the same benefits 
as directed verdict, in a broader range of cases.
229
 
Personal injury cases brought against railroads or manufacturers raised 
special concerns about jury bias.
230
 The practices in federal courts gave 
judges considerably more control over juries than in most state courts. 
Although directed verdict and comment on evidence often worked in favor 
of defendant railroads and manufacturers, federal trial judges also used 
their powers of judicial comment in favor of plaintiffs. The Supreme Court 
consistently held that such comments were unreviewable.
231
 
By 1887, the Court was defining the constitutional phrase “trial by 
jury” to mean a trial in which the judge could comment on evidence if he 
chose.
232
 In United States v. Philadelphia & Railroad Co., the Court upheld 
the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that “while the court does not desire 
to control your finding, but submits the question to you, it is of the opinion 
that you should not, under the circumstances, find for the plaintiff.”233 The 
Court continued this constitutional definition in later cases, in stronger 
terms.
234
 In 1930 the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “trial by jury” 
 
226. Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24, at 488–89. 
227. Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 121 (1874) (upholding a directed verdict). 
228. Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24, at 489. 
229. For a justification of comment on evidence based on the need for a trial judge to consider a 
motion for a new trial because of a verdict against the evidence, see Consequa v. Willings, 6 F. Cas. 
336, 337 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 3128). 
230. Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24 at 486-89. 
231. See, e.g., Vicksburg, 118 U.S. at 553-54 (declaring unreviewable the trial judge’s comments to 
the jury giving his opinion that the defendant railroad was negligent in maintaining tracks). 
232. “Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is a trial presided over by a judge, with 
authority, not only to rule on objections to evidence, and to instruct the jury upon the law, but also, 
when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by explaining and 
commenting upon the testimony, and even giving them his opinion upon questions of fact.” 
Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 123 U.S. at 114. 
233. Id. at 117. 
234. Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (“‘Trial by jury’ in the primary and 
usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions . . . is a trial by a jury of 
12 men in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the 
law and advise them on the facts . . . .”). 
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meant jury trial as understood and applied at common law, which required, 
among other things, “that the trial should be in the presence and under the 
superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them [the jury] as to 
the law and advise them in respect of the facts.”235 These elements, the 
Court announced, were beyond the power of the legislature to alter.
236
 The 
trial judge’s power to comment on evidence was an essential element of 
jury trial under both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.
237
 
B.  Review of Capital Cases in the Supreme Court: 1889 
In 1889, as the number of judgments of circuit courts held by single 
judges grew, Congress acted to help redress the problem of a lack of appeal 
in criminal cases.
238
 The 1889 Act altered the jurisdiction of certain courts. 
Most important, under the Act, the Supreme Court could review federal 
convictions for capital crimes.
239
 
1.  Judge Isaac Parker and the Origins of the 1889 Act 
Congress had long been concerned about a lack of review in criminal 
cases. The provision of the 1889 Act, however, was specially motivated by 
anxiety about—even hostility toward—a particular judge, together with 
questions about jurisdiction in Indian Territory and Indian policy. These 
concerns were closely related to appellate control of judicial comment on 
evidence, as will be seen later in the discussion of cases in the Supreme 
Court from the Western District of Arkansas. 
The provision of the 1889 Act was passed in part to control a single 
judge: the federal district judge for the Western District of Arkansas, Isaac 
Parker (1838-1896).
240
 The Western District of Arkansas had an unusual 
jurisdiction which included large parts of the Indian Territory, in what is 
now Oklahoma. The federal courts for this area had jurisdiction over 
 
235. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930) (holding that a criminal defendant may 
waive the right to a 12-person jury where one of the jurors is excused because of illness during the 
trial). 
236. Id. at 290. “These common law elements are embedded in the constitutional provisions above 
quoted, and are beyond the authority of the legislative department to destroy or abridge.” Id. 
237. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650 n.4 (1948). 
238. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stat. 655 (“An act to abolish circuit court powers of certain 
district courts of the United States, and to provide for writs of error in capital cases, and for other 
purposes.”). 
239. Id.§ 6. 
240. Parker is hardly an obscure figure in the literature of the American West. He has been the 
subject of a half dozen biographies. For a historiography of Parker, see ROGER H. TULLER, “LET NO 
GUILTY MAN ESCAPE”: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY OF “HANGING JUDGE” ISAAC C. PARKER 3-9 (2001). 
Parker is, however, not well-known in the federal courts literature, and his role in provoking restrictions 
on comment in federal courts has been overlooked. 
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crimes committed by or against non-Indians in the Indian Territory.
241
 
(According to treaties, Indian tribal courts had jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by Indians against Indians.
242
) 
Isaac Parker began his judgeship in circumstances that were, to put it 
mildly, difficult. His immediate predecessor as district judge was William 
Story, a corrupt and incompetent hack. Story had freed condemned 
prisoners on bond pending execution.
243
 In 1874, Story resigned to avoid 
impeachment for taking bribes.
244
 Many perceived the Indian Territory as a 
place where law was not enforced, especially during the tenure of Judge 
Story, and the area attracted and nurtured notorious gangs and outlaws. The 
lack of effective extradition laws caused fugitives from justice to flock 
there.
245
 Murders, robberies, rapes, and horse thefts were commonplace.
246
 
It was popularly known as “Robbers’ Roost” and the “Land of the Six-
Shooter.”247 
In May 1875, Isaac Parker arrived at Fort Smith, Arkansas as the new 
district judge. He had served as a Missouri state judge and a U.S. 
Congressman for Missouri. While in Congress, he had championed 
Indians’ rights and become known as “the Indians’ best friend.”248 He was 
determined to create order and respect for law in the Indian Territory. On 
September 3, 1875, six persons he had sentenced to death—three whites, 
two Indians, and a black—were hanged at once, all for murder. The 
 
241. Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act). In 
1790, in the Trade and Intercourse Act, Congress extended the criminal jurisdiction of federal courts to 
U.S. citizens in “Indian Country,” including Indian Territory. Act of July 22, 1790, c. 33, §§ 5 & 6, 1 
Stat. 137, 138. In 1817, Congress enacted a statute that became known as the Federal Enclaves Act, 
which extended federal jurisdiction over Indians who committed crimes against non-Indians. 18 U.S.C. 
§1152 (2016). This provision was codified in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, supra. I thank 
Gregory Ablavsky for this information. In 1851, the new Western District of Arkansas was given 
jurisdiction over part of the Indian Territory. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, c. 23, 9 Stat. 594. 
242. In 1885, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385, which extended federal 
jurisdiction to certain major crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian country. The statute 
was prompted by concerns about the actions of a Sioux tribal court in a murder case, permitted to stand 
by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW 
DOG’S CASE 129-141 (1994). 
243. TULLER, supra note 240, at 63. 
244. GLENN SHIRLEY, LAW WEST OF FORT SMITH 16-17 (1968). 
245. TULLER, supra note 240, at 47–48; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 21. 
246. The editor of Fort Smith’s Western Independent despaired. “We have lived in and around the 
Indian country since the spring of 1834, but have never known such a state of terror. Now it is murder 
throughout the length and breadth of the Indian country. It has been the rendezvous of the vile and 
wicked from everywhere, an inviting field for murder and robbery . . . . Stealing horses is an everyday 
occurrence, and murder and robbery seem equal to that sin. It is dangerous to travel alone where villains 
from four quarters of the United States congregate to murder, rob and steal.” Editorial, WESTERN 
INDEPENDENT (Fort Smith), Aug. 28, 1873, quoted in SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 23. 
247. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 24. 
248. TULLER, supra note 240, at 34–41; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 27–28. 
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morning of the executions, over 5,000 persons packed the jail yard.
249
 The 
executions attracted national attention and unfavorable coverage in the 
press in other parts of the country. A reporter for Fort Smith’s Western 
Independent expressed the local view: The men died because “they are 
preying wolves upon the lives and property of their fellow beings, unfit to 
live and unsafe to remain at large,” a fact which “should not be lost in the 
excitement and glare of the terrible exhibition.”250 Parker’s effectiveness 
and incorruptibility won enthusiastic support from the local press, even 
from papers initially skeptical of him.
251
 
A crucial element of Parker’s law enforcement efforts were the deputy 
marshals. During Parker’s tenure on the bench, about 200 deputy marshals 
were appointed, of whom around 40 or 50 served at a given time. The 
deputies were tasked with policing and arrests.
252
 At the end of his life, 
Parker stated that during his time as a judge, 65 of the deputy marshals in 
his district were killed performing their duties.
253
 Parker seems to have 
understated the carnage; modern scholarly estimates range from 75 to 100 
deputy marshals killed in the district during that time.
254
 It is difficult to 
understand what motivated so many men to take such a dangerous job. The 
deputies seem to have taken pride in being one of “the men who rode for 
Parker.”255 Evading arrest in the Indian Territory was an elaborate and 
frequent activity, known as “scouting.”256 Gangs often had elaborate 
lookout systems for deputy marshals. Adding to the difficulty of arresting 
violent criminals, gangs had often so intimidated the population that many 
ordinary persons helped to conceal fugitives and impeded deputy 
marshals.
257
 Parker persevered, with the help of the deputies, and more 
executions followed.
258
 In many the of murder trials Parker presided over, 
the victim was a deputy marshal. As will be seen, Parker commented 
 
249. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 35–40; TULLER, supra note 240, at 53. 
250. Report of J.W. Weaver, quoted in SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 40. 
251. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 62. 
252. The movie “True Grit,” starring John Wayne in the 1969 version, and Jeff Bridges in the 2010 
version, is thought to be based on the activities of Henry “Heck” Thomas, a U.S. deputy marshal during 
Parker’s tenure. 
253. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 47. 
254. MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, ISAAC C. PARKER: FEDERAL JUSTICE ON THE FRONTIER 42 (2003) 
[hereinafter BRODHEAD, PARKER]. 
255. BRODHEAD, PARKER supra note 254. Another motivation may have been the illegal advantage 
deputy marshals took in staking out claims before the official opening of the Unassigned Lands in 
Indian Territory to settlement. See William W. Howard, The Rush to Oklahoma, HARPER’S WEEKLY, 
May 18, 1889, at 391-92. 
256. Supreme Court opinions concerning appeals from Judge Parker’s court refer to the practice of 
“scouting.” See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 444 (1893); Hickory v. United States, 160 
U.S. 408, 411 (1896). 
257. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 41–64. 
258. TULLER, supra note 240, at 63–64; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 61–62. 
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powerfully to juries about the need to deter killers of deputy marshals, 
comments which drew the disapproval of the Supreme Court. 
Parker’s actions drew attention to the lack of appeals to federal courts 
in criminal cases. He also incurred the hostility of members of Congress 
who wanted to open the Indian Territory to more  settlement. Parker 
opposed non-Indian expansion into the Indian Territory and supported the 
titles of the tribes and the jurisdiction of tribal courts.
259
 The possibility of 
opening the Unassigned Lands—lands that had not been assigned to any 
tribe—in Indian Territory to non-Indian settlement had long been a 
contentious political issue. The law reformers and expansionists together 
succeeded in passing the Act of 1889. Parker was clearly a trigger. Both 
sponsors of the bill, Senator James K. Jones and Representative John 
Rogers, represented Arkansas. Senator George Vest of Missouri, an 
enthusiastic supporter of non-Indian settlement in Indian Territory, singled 
out Parker in a speech in favor of the bill. Vest argued that Parker had 
executed men for years “without any right to ask the Supreme Court of the 
United States whether it be judicial murder or not.”260 Less than a month 
after the act was signed providing appeals in capital cases to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, President Grover Cleveland signed an act permitting non-
Indian settlement in the Unassigned Lands in Indian Territory beginning at 
a specific date and time.
261
 The Oklahoma land rush, an extraordinary 
episode in American history, accordingly started at noon on April 22, 
1889.
262
 
With the arrival of appeals in criminal cases to the Supreme Court, 
Parker’s practices of addressing juries came under judicial scrutiny. The 
result was a significant change in rules concerning judicial comment on 
evidence. 
2.  Change in Review of Judicial Comment 
It was the advent of review of criminal cases—at a time when almost 
no justices traveled circuit and heard trials any longer—that undid the rule 
that the Supreme Court would not consider a trial court’s comments on 
evidence. To my knowledge, scholars have not discussed this change, nor 
the role that Isaac Parker played in provoking it. For only a few years, 
between 1889 and 1897, the Supreme Court regularly heard first appeals of 
 
259. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 140–41. 
260. 19 CONG. REC. 5611 (1888). 
261. Indian Appropriations Act of 1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980 (signed March 2, 1889). 
262. Harper’s Weekly published a fascinating account. “Unlike Rome, the city of Guthrie 
[Oklahoma] was built in a day. To be strictly accurate in the matter, it might be said that it was built in 
an afternoon. At twelve o’clock on Monday, April 22d, the resident population of Guthrie was nothing; 
before sundown it was at least ten thousand.” Howard, supra note 255, at 391. 
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capital murder cases. Prior to that, the Court essentially only heard a 
criminal appeal if there was a division in the trial court. After that, the 
Court routinely heard cases of tax fraud, drug distribution, and regulatory 
crimes—and those mostly already heard in the circuit courts of appeals. 
The unusual eight years strongly marked the practice of the federal courts 
concerning judicial comment on evidence. 
Early in this period, the Supreme Court suggested that the Court would 
extend to criminal cases the rule about not reviewing a trial judge’s 
comments on evidence. In a criminal case in 1891, the court applied the 
longstanding rule that it would not review judicial comments on fact.
263
 
That was a case of embezzlement from a bank. 
Over the next few years, however, the Supreme Court decided a mass 
of cases on review from the Western District of Arkansas and Judge Isaac 
Parker. The cases from the Western District of Arkansas were not cases of 
embezzlement from a bank. They were murders: capital cases. The stakes 
were high, and the Court emphasized this. In these cases, the Court 
fundamentally changed its method of review, and thoroughly examined 
Parker’s statements to the jury on fact for undue influence. These cases 
from the 1890s were cited repeatedly in later opinions of the Supreme 
Court and of the circuit courts of appeal in overturning verdicts. 
Isaac Parker was “a verdict-getting judge.”264 To many, he exemplified 
the dangers of the single judge with unchecked power. He viewed himself 
as primarily responsible for maintaining law and order in his district, 
especially in the Indian Territory. He thought certainty of punishment was 
more important in deterring crime than severity, and declared at the end of 
his life that he would be happy to abolish the death penalty if crime 
received more certain and swift punishment.
265
 He worked hard to maintain 
a group of deputy marshals to do dangerous jobs and to take great risks, 
and he wanted to make sure the deputies were rewarded by prompt trials of 
the persons they arrested, “with a large percentage of convictions.”266 
 
263. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 172–73 (1891) (citing Vicksburg in a criminal case 
for embezzlement). In that case, the trial court had told the jury that “he regarded the testimony [against 
the defendant] as convincing.” Id. at 172. 
264. The phrase is taken from New York lawyer Theron Strong and his description of New York 
judge George C. Barrett. THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 103 (1914). 
265. Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra 
note 240, at 156. 
266. Harry P. Daily, Judge Isaac C. Parker, 11 CHRONS. OF OKLA. (1933). On the dangers to the 
deputy marshals, see supra text accompanying notes 252-257. The deputy marshals were paid primarily 
for the arrest of wanted men, and were ineligible to receive federal rewards. The federal deputies could, 
however, and often did, collect rewards from state and local authorities, private persons, and railroads 
and other transportation companies. Parker frequently complained of the low official pay of the 
deputies, and wrote to Congress to try to get higher pay for them. Parker explained that the costs to 
deputy marshals were higher in the Indian Territories than in more settled parts of the country, in which 
law enforcement could count on the support of the local population. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 46. 
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Parker’s charges to the jury in criminal cases were vigorous, often 
lasting an hour and a half,
267
 sometimes quoting the Bible and using the 
language of moral condemnation. In one case in which a defendant fled 
following a killing, Judge Parker commented to the jury by reading several 
passages from the Bible, including the story of Cain’s murder of Abel and a 
verse from Proverbs: “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.”268 The 
inhabitants of his district were varied and polyglot; over 30 tribes coexisted 
in the Indian Territory, and there were also whites and blacks, and many of 
mixed ancestry. Parker believed it necessary to explain basic principles of 
law and treaties to juries in the area and to give detailed guidance in his 
lengthy charges. Parker responded vigorously to his critics: “I have been 
accused of leading juries. I tell you a jury should be led . . . if they are 
guided they will render justice.”269 Parker worked to ensure that jurors were 
properly paid for their service, and he expressed his gratitude for their 
undertaking the inconvenience and burdens.
270
 Henry Starr—a half-
Cherokee gang leader who was twice convicted of murder in Parker’s court 
and went on to a lucrative career as a bank robber after the Supreme Court 
reversed his convictions—had a different opinion of these jurors. Starr, 
however, agreed about Parker’s influence: “Arkansas is noted for ignorance 
and Hill-Billyism, and fifty percent of the jurymen were drawn from 
backwoods counties and were completely dominated by the powerful 
personality of Judge Parker.”271 
It is possible that Parker was reacting in his charges to the newly 
aggressive defense lawyers who had begun to practice in his court. The 
most effective of these was J. Warren Reed, a West Virginian who arrived 
in Fort Smith in 1889
272
 and soon discovered the value of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court. He was the first defense counsel to appeal a murder 
conviction from Parker to the Supreme Court, and he won a reversal in 
1891.
273
 He also aggressively applied to the President for executive 
clemency. Other lawyers rapidly joined Reed as news of his success 
spread.
274
 Because of Parker’s activities, there was a ready supply of clients 
waiting at the jail. 
 
267. TULLER, supra note 240, at 147. The Supreme Court, in reviewing one of Parker’s charges, 
commented that it took up twenty pages of the printed record. Hickory, 160 U.S. at 409. 
268. Hickory, 160 U.S. at 415-16. 
269. Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra 
note 240, at 156. 
270. BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 50–51. 
271. Id. at 51. 
272. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 147. 
273. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891). 
274. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 155. 
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Between 1889 and 1897, 49 criminal cases from Parker’s court were 
appealed to the Supreme Court, almost all convictions for capital murder.
275
 
Of these 49, the Supreme Court affirmed 13 and reversed 36.
276
 Sometimes 
the Court reversed a particular defendant’s conviction multiple times. 
Several reversals were noteworthy for the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
Parker’s comments on evidence to the jury. 
In 1893, on appeal from Judge Parker, the Court reversed a conviction 
in part on the ground of judicial comments on fact.
277
 Some knowledge of 
the facts is necessary to understand the judicial comments and reversal. In 
Hicks v. United States, Hicks, a Cherokee, was tried for aiding and abetting 
the murder of a white man, Colvard. At the time Colvard was killed, Hicks 
and Rowe, another Cherokee, were evading U.S. marshals who had 
warrants for their arrest. Hicks and Rowe were armed to resist arrest.
278
 
Hicks and Rowe seem to have suspected Colvard was trying to apprehend 
them, and Rowe shot and killed him. (Rowe was later killed by deputy 
marshals trying to arrest him.) At Hicks’s trial, several witnesses testified 
that Hicks had made statements at the time of the killing suggesting that he 
expected and encouraged Rowe to shoot Colvard, and that after Rowe did 
so, the two rode off together.
279
 Hicks testified that he had tried to persuade 
Rowe not to shoot Colvard.
280
 
Parker told the jury that they should consider Hicks’s interest in the 
case in deciding whether his testimony was true.
281
 The Supreme Court was 
concerned that a judge’s adverse comment on defendant’s testimony would 
in effect take from him the ability to testify on his own behalf. Congress 
had given criminal defendants the right to testify under oath in federal court 
 
275. Westlaw search. For proceedings begun after September 1, 1896, Congress ended direct review 
of criminal cases from the Indian Territory by the Supreme Court, and provided appeals in lower courts. 
Act of Mar. 1, 1895, c. 145, 28 Stat. 693 (providing for a special court of appeal for criminal cases in 
the Indian Territory, composed of three district judges, with a further appeal to the circuit court of 
appeal). 
276. Six of the reversals were on motion or confession of error of the Solicitor General. Davenport 
v. United States, 163 U.S. 682 (1896); Goldsby v. United States, 163 U.S. 688 (1896); Luckey v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 692 (1896); King v. United States, 164 U.S. 701 (1896); Thornton v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 707 (1896); Kettenring v. United States, 168 U.S. 703 (1897). 
277. Hicks, 150 U.S. at 450–53. 
278. Id. at 444. 
279. Id. at 445–46. 
280. Id. at 446. 
281. Parker said, “You are to consider [defendant’s] interest in this case, you are to consider his 
consequent motive growing out of that interest, in passing upon the truthfulness or falsity of his 
statement. He is in an attitude, of course, where any of us, if so situated, would have a large interest in 
the result of the case; the largest, perhaps, we could have under any circumstances in life; and such an 
interest, consequently, as might cause us to make statements to influence a jury in passing upon our 
case that would not be governed by the truth. We might be led away from the truth because of our 
desire. Therefore it is but right, and it is your duty, to view the statements of such a witness in the light 
of his attitude and in the light of other evidence.” Id. at 451. 
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in 1878.
282
 In Hicks, the Court stated that the defendant’s privilege to 
testify on his own behalf “would be a vain one if the judge, to whose 
lightest word the jury, properly enough, give a great weight, should 
intimate that the dreadful condition in which the accused finds himself 
should deprive his testimony of probability. . . . The policy of this 
enactment should not be defeated by hostile comments of the trial judge, 
whose duty it is to give reasonable effect and force to the law.”283 The 
Court believed such adverse comment was especially problematic because 
it viewed the evidence against the defendant as weak.
284
 Judicial comment 
on defendant’s testimony continued to be a point of special concern for 
appellate courts, including later cases in the Supreme Court reversing Judge 
Parker.
285
 
In Hicks, Justice David Brewer, with Justice Henry Brown dissented 
strongly, arguing that the Court should adhere to the longstanding rule that 
a judgment would not be reversed because of a judge’s comments on 
fact.
286
 Brewer rejected the idea that the judge had to be especially careful 
about comment on the defendant’s testimony: “The statute makes the 
defendant a competent witness. It affirms nothing as to his credibility.”287 
Brewer, like his English counterparts, was concerned about the use of 
appeals in criminal cases to reverse convictions on technical grounds.
288
 
In later cases of appeals from Judge Parker, the Court admonished 
Parker for his general tone of “indignation.” In Starr v. United States, 
Henry Starr shot to death a deputy marshal who was trying to arrest him on 
a warrant for horse theft.
289
 Starr claimed he had shot the deputy in self-
defense. On appeal, Chief Justice Fuller observed that the “circumstances 
 
282. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, c. 37, 20 Stat. 30. 
283. Hicks, 150 U.S. at 452. 
284. Id. 
285. See Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1895) (reversing murder conviction for 
Judge Parker’s improper comment on defendant’s testimony); Hickory, 160 U.S. at 424–25 (reversing 
murder conviction for killing a deputy marshal trying to arrest defendant for Judge Parker’s improper 
comment on defendant’s testimony). In Allison, the Court was also concerned that Parker’s summing up 
did not discuss testimony about a fact favorable to the accused, which was not contradicted. “Justice 
and the law demanded that, so far as reference was made to the evidence, that which was favorable to 
the accused should not be excluded.” Allison, 160 U.S. at 212. 
286. Hicks, 150 U.S. at 453–60. Brewer, Brown, and Rufus Peckham were frequent dissenters in 
reversals of convictions on appeal from Judge Parker. See, e.g., Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 
317 (1894). 
287. Id. at 459. 
288. TULLER, supra note 240, at 154; MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, 1837-1910, at 111-13 (1994) [hereinafter BRODHEAD, BREWER]. Brewer’s 
antipathy toward crime and criminals arose partly from his strong Christian beliefs (he was the son of 
New England missionaries), and partly from his experiences as a young lawyer and judge in the new 
state of Kansas in the early1860s. BRODHEAD, BREWER, supra, at 1-3, 11-12. Brodhead has called 
Brewer “Parker’s only consistent friend on the Supreme Court.” Id. at 111-12. 
289. Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 615 (1894). 
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of this case apparently aroused the indignation of the learned judge in an 
uncommon degree.”290 Parker had expressed himself strongly to the jury on 
the subject of dangers to deputy marshals. He told the jury, “Without these 
officers, what is the use of this court? It takes men who are brave to enforce 
the law here. . . . [T]here is no protection unless the law is upheld by men 
of this kind . . . .” 291  Fuller expressed the Court’s “disapprobation” of 
these comments and denied that different methods of instructing a jury 
might be appropriate in different areas of the country. “Whatever special 
necessity for enforcing the law in all its rigor there may be in a particular 
quarter of the country,” the rules and manner of the administration of 
justice should be the same everywhere, and “argumentative matter of this 
sort should not be thrown into the scales by the judicial officer who holds 
them.”292 
Relations between the Supreme Court and Judge Parker escalated into a 
forensic battle. In 1895, the infamous gang leader Cherokee Bill (whose 
real name was Crawford Goldsby) killed the jailer at Fort Smith while in 
jail awaiting review by the Supreme Court of his conviction for a previous 
murder. Parker pointedly criticized the Supreme Court in a statement to a 
newspaper in St. Louis, where he was visiting relatives.
293
 He asked why, 
when crime generally was decreasing in the Indian Territories, murder had 
increased. He attributed the rise in murders to reversals of convictions by 
the Supreme Court.
294
 These reversals undermined the swiftness and 
certainty of punishment that he—like the English judges—thought so 
important to deterrence.
295
 “First, the convicted murderer has a long 
breathing spell before his case comes before the Supreme Court; then, 
when it does come before that body, the conviction may be quashed; and 
wherever it is quashed it is always upon the flimsiest technicalities. The 
Supreme Court never touches the merits of the case.”296 
Parker attributed the Supreme Court’s reversals to the lack of 
experience of most of the justices with criminal cases. He referred to the 
justices’ inexperience with criminal cases repeatedly, most notably in an 
interview with a reporter shortly before his death: “The justices are men 
 
290. Id. at 626. Fuller continued, “and that indignation was expressed in terms which were not 
consistent with due regard to the right and duty of the jury to exercise an independent judgment in the 
premises, or with the circumspection and caution which should characterize judicial utterances.” Id. 
291. Parker continued: “You are to stand by the nation. You are to say to all the people that no man 
can trample upon the law, wickedly, violently, and ruthlessly; that it must be upheld if it has been 
violated.” Id. at 627. 
292. Id. at 627–28. 
293. Isaac C. Parker, statement to the Globe-Democrat (St. Louis), July 30, 1895, at 9, quoted in 
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 156. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 156–57. 
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from civil walks of life; it is not then surprising that they are liable to err in 
criminal cases.”297 Such inexperienced persons were apt to “utterly forget 
the hardened character of the criminals I have to deal with,” to forget the 
family the convict made fatherless.
298
 
The Court, in Starr and in other cases, remarked on the youth of the 
defendants;
299
 Starr was 18 when he shot the deputy marshal.
300
 After 
shooting the deputy marshal and before he was arrested seven months later, 
Starr used his new notoriety to organize a well-known gang which 
committed a string of robberies and horse thefts.
301
 The Court’s reversal of 
his conviction spared Starr from hanging; on retrial, a jury convicted Starr 
again, and again the Supreme Court reversed the conviction for Parker’s 
instructions to the jury on how to weigh the flight of the accused.
302
 
An important point of difference between the opinions for the Court 
and for the dissent concerned beliefs about the effect of judicial comment 
on the jury. Different views on this subject permeated debates about 
comment on evidence, among courts and commentators. In Hicks, the 
Court stated that the jury gave the judge’s “lightest word . . . great 
weight.”303 In contrast, Brewer credited the jury with independence of 
thought.
304
 Earlier, in 1851, Chief Justice Roger Taney had pointed out an 
apparent contradiction in the argument of those who supported restrictions 
on judicial comment. Taney denied that the trial court’s comments would 
have “an undue and improper influence” on the jury’s minds and 
decision.
305
 He observed that such an objection “questions their intelligence 
and independence, qualities which cannot be brought into doubt without 
 
297. Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra 
note 240, at 156. 
298. Id. 
299. See, e.g., Allison, 160 U.S. at 203 (defendant was about 20 years old at the time of the killing); 
Hickory, 160 U.S. at409 (defendant was 19 years old at the time of the killing). 
300. Starr, 153 U.S. at 615. 
301. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 175–80. 
302. Starr v. United States, 164 U.S. 627, 631–32 (1897); see also Hickory, 160 U.S. at 414–23. 
After Starr was convicted for murder a third time before a different judge and was serving a sentence in 
prison, President Theodore Roosevelt pardoned hin in 1903 because of his role in encouraging the 
surrender of his fellow inmate, Crawford Goldsby (“Cherokee Bill”), during an attempted jailbreak in 
1895. See BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 159. On the attempted jailbreak, see supra text 
accompanying note 293. Following the reversals of his murder convictions and the pardon, Henry Starr 
went on to a lucrative career as a bank robber. BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 159. He is 
thought to have robbed at least 21 banks. A silent movie was made about him, released in 1919, called 
“A Debtor to the Law.” In the movie, Henry Starr played himself. Id. at 187. In 1921, at the age of 46, 
Starr was shot fatally while robbing a bank. Id. at 159. 
303. Hicks, 150 U.S. at 452. 
304. Id. at 459 (“Is it not clear that they [the jurors] would understand simply that their attention 
was called to the effect on his [defendant’s] credibility of a contradiction between his testimony and 
that of disinterested witnesses?”). 
305. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 131 (1851). 
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taking from that tribunal the confidence and respect which so justly belong 
to it, in questions of fact.”306 In the late twentieth century, Judge Jack 
Weinstein expressed the same opinion.
307
 
C.  Creation of an Intermediate Court of Appeals: 1891 
1.  The Evarts Act 
For many years, the battles between the House and Senate discussed 
above prevented federal legislation addressing the structure of the courts. In 
1891, the stalemate broke and Congress passed the Circuit Court of 
Appeals Act,
308
 known as the Evarts Act, creating an intermediate court of 
appeals. William Evarts, an eminent lawyer and Republican senator from 
New York who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was 
mainly responsible for the act.
309
 
The sittings of the new circuit courts of appeal were to be held by 
three-judge panels, with two judges constituting a quorum.
310
 On these 
panels were eligible to sit the circuit judges of the circuit (now two per 
circuit), district judges of the circuit, and the Supreme Court justice 
assigned to the circuit.
311
 The Act reduced the mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil cases and made many cases 
reviewable there only by certification of the circuit court of appeals or by 
writ of certiorari.
312
 The justices got immediate relief, with a drop in their 
caseload.
313
 The drop in review of civil cases more than compensated for an 
increase in criminal appeals. The Evarts Act made convictions in any 
“capital or otherwise infamous crime” directly appealable from the trial 
court to the Supreme Court.
314
 
Under the Evarts Act, the district courts became the primary trial 
courts, but the old circuit courts were not abolished. The maintenance of 
the circuit courts as trial courts was a critical concession. Evarts himself 
regarded it as important to bring appellate judges “in contact with the 
 
306. Id. 
307. Weinstein, supra note 5, at 163. For a contrary view, see Saltzburg, supra note 7, at 39-40. 
308. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
309. CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN 480-83 
(1941); BRAINERD DYER, THE PUBLIC CAREER OF WILLIAM M. EVARTS 257-60 (1933, republished 
1969). Evarts became convinced of the necessity of an intermediate court of appeals partly because of 
the persistent complaints and assiduous cultivation of Chief Justice Melville Fuller. Glick, supra note 
164, at 1824–26. 
310. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 2. 
311. Id. § 3. 
312. Id. §§ 5, 6. 
313. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 102. 
314. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 5. 
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profession and the suitors and the people in the courts of first instance as 
frequently as possible.”315 Some Democrats were willing to support the 
measure because circuit judges would continue to preside over jury trials 
and “intermingle with the people.”316 Apparently it was enough for the 
circuit judges, rather than the Supreme Court justices, to hear trials. 
Although the Evarts Act did not entirely end circuit riding by justices, most 
justices gave it up at that point.
317
 
The compromise of maintaining the circuit trial courts was undone 
because of the old problem of making sure that judges did not hear appeals 
of cases they had decided below, combined with a new sense of strict 
hierarchy in the federal courts. A district judge sometimes needed to sit on 
the appellate court when a circuit judge had to recuse himself because of 
having presided in the circuit trial court. This situation was not only an 
administrative nuisance, but offended the growing sense of judicial 
hierarchy. A report of the House Judiciary Committee in 1890 favored 
abolishing the circuit trials courts in order to create a pure and distinct 
three-tiered system. Abolition of the circuit trial courts and creation of an 
intermediate court “secures the absolute independence . . . of the three 
classes of courts, to wit, district, circuit, and Supreme.”318 Commentators 
even compared the federal judiciary to the officer corps of the army, the 
epitome of hierarchy: “It looks odd to see an inferior judge reverse his 
superior—a captain reversing his general’s orders!”319 
The growing sense of hierarchy in the federal courts echoed the 
systematizing and increasingly strict hierarchy that railroads had adopted in 
the late nineteenth century for their legal counsel. Railroads were the first 
corporations to develop clear chains of command for legal services, in 
order to handle the mass of litigation that railroads were constantly 
involved in.
320
 The railroads usually used a three-tiered structure of general 
counsel, division counsel (responsible for a group of states), and local 
attorneys.
321
 This organization resembled the three-tiered structure 
recommended for the federal courts. Many prominent lawyers in the late 
nineteenth century—including both Lincoln and Evarts—had worked 
extensively for railroads as either in-house counsel or outside counsel. 
These lawyers were therefore increasingly used to hierarchies within the 
 
315. 21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1891) (statement of Senator William Evarts of New York). 
316. Id. at 10,231 (statement of Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama). On support for appellate 
judges also hearing trials, see Holt, supra note 198, at 8. 
317. Glick, supra note 164, at 1829. 
318. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jurisdiction of United States Courts, H. Rep. No. 1295 (1890), 
quoted in Holt, supra note 198, at 7. 
319. Henry Wollman, The Danger of the Federal Judiciary, N. AM. REV., Mar. 1895, at 379. 
320. LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 1021, 1023. 
321. Id. at 1023. 
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legal profession. Former and current railroad lawyers vigorously asserted 
the need for judicial hierarchy in order to manage swelling caseloads.
322
 
Although some representatives still argued for appellate judges 
mingling with the people and making sure justice was done in the trial 
courts,
323
 theirs was a losing cause. In 1911, Congress abolished the old 
circuit courts and killed the justices’ circuit riding.324 In the federal courts, 
trial judges and appellate judges were now distinct. Despite their equally 
secure tenure, trial and appellate judges were increasingly viewed as 
markedly different. 
2.  Later Cases in the Supreme Court Concerning  
Comment on Evidence 
After 1911, the Supreme Court mostly got out of the business of 
reviewing trial judges’ comments to juries. That job went to the circuit 
courts of appeal instead. We have seen that the Evarts Act in 1891 caused 
most appeals in civil cases to go to the circuit courts of appeal, while 
appeals in criminal cases went directly to the Supreme Court. After that, 
Congress transferred criminal appeals to the circuit courts of appeal in two 
stages. In 1897, Congress restricted review by the Supreme Court directly 
from the trial court to capital cases. Other convictions went to the circuit 
courts of appeal for review.
325
 In 1911, Congress eliminated direct review 
of capital convictions by the Supreme Court; all criminal convictions were 
reviewable in the circuit court of appeals.
326
 The Supreme Court got almost 
complete control of its docket in 1925.
327
 
Once the justices could pick which issues to decide, judicial comment 
on evidence was rarely among them. Policing the comments of trial courts 
was left mainly to the circuit courts. A later stage of this research will 
examine the practices of the different circuits and regional variation among 
them, together with the frequency and strength of comment in the trial 
courts over time. The circuit courts of appeals frequently cited the opinions 
 
322. At the 1897 American Bar Association conference, former railroad lawyer James H. Raymond 
argued that “the whole idea of a Court of Appeals is absolutely in its very integrity destroyed when any 
officer . . . of that court also performs duty in an inferior court.” 1897 American Bar Association 
Conference, at 62. 
323. Holt, supra note 198, at 12–13. 
324. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. The Judiciary Act of 1925 removed the Supreme 
Court further from ordinary cases, by making most of its docket discretionary. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 
229, 43 Stat. 936. Writs of certiorari replaced mandatory appeals to the Court for almost all cases. 
325. Act of Jan. 20, 1897, c. 68, 29 Stat. 492. 
326. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 5, 36 Stat. 1087, 1088. 
327. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
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of the Supreme Court reversing Judge Parker for his comments on 
evidence.
328
 
In a civil case in 1913, Justice Holmes expressed impatience about 
“what seem to us meticulous objections to every detail in the conduct of the 
trial,” and the Court upheld the trial court’s comments.329 
In criminal cases, the Court occasionally overturned convictions, 
relying heavily on previous opinions reversing Judge Parker. Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes wrote the opinion in the leading modern case, 
Quercia v. United States,
330
 in 1933. Hughes explained that federal trial 
judges have the power to comment on evidence, and quoted Matthew 
Hale’s description of the practice’s value.331 He then warned that the 
“privilege of the judge to comment on the facts has its inherent limitations. 
His discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial . . . . His 
privilege of comment in order to give appropriate assistance to the jury is 
too important to be left without safeguards against abuses.”332 There 
followed a long string of descriptions of the holdings of the Court’s cases 
reversing Judge Parker, with citations.
333
 
In Quercia, a Narcotic Act case, the trial judge had observed the 
defendant wiping his hands during his testimony and commented to the 
jury that “that is almost always an indication of lying.”334 The First Circuit 
had upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court condemned the trial judge’s 
“sweeping denunciation” and did not doubt that it was “highly prejudicial.” 
This error was not cured by the trial court’s statement that his opinion of 
the evidence was not binding on the jury, the Court held, citing the reversal 
of Judge Parker in Starr v. United States.
335
 Quercia is cited in almost 
 
328. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 106 F. 892, 895 (6th Cir. 1901) (reversing conviction and 
citing Starr, Hickory, and Allison); Oppenheim v. United States, 241 F. 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1917) 
(reversing conviction and citing Starr, Allison, and Hicks); Weare v. United States, 1 F.2d 617, 618 (8th 
Cir. 1924) (reversing conviction and citing Starr and Hickory); O’Shaughnessy v. United States, 17 
F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1927) (reversing conviction and citing Starr and Hickory); Malaga v. United 
States, 57 F.2d 822, 827 (1st Cir. 1932) (reversing conviction and citing Starr, Hickory, Allison, and 
Hicks). 
329. Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913). The judge charged the jury “that it was 
‘not a case for sentimental considerations of any kind,’ with more in the same direction.” Id. at 481. 
330. 289 U.S. 466 (1933). 
331. Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469 (quoting HALE, supra note 42, at 291-92). 
332. Id. at 470. 
333. Id. at 470–71 (citing Hicks, Starr, Allison, and Hickory). The Court also acknowledged the 
growing importance of the circuit courts of appeal in this area. Hughes described a rule that had 
developed in the courts of appeal: When no testimony had been offered as to the previous character of 
the accused, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to comment unfavorably on his general character. 
Id. at 471 (citing cases from the courts of appeals). 
334. Id. at 468. “Why that should be so we don’t know, but that is the fact. I think that every single 
word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government’s testimony, was a lie.” Id. 
335. Id. at 472 (citing Starr, 289 U.S. at 472). 
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every decision by the courts of appeals concerning judicial comment on 
evidence. 
The Supreme Court swooped in once again in 1933, the same year as 
Quercia, with the last significant opinion on comment on evidence.
336
 The 
defendant was convicted of refusing to supply information concerning his 
income tax returns. The trial court told the jury his opinion that the 
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
337
 The Seventh Circuit 
had reversed. The Court declared that, “[a]lthough the power of the judge 
to express an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant exists,” it should be 
exercised “cautiously” and “only in exceptional cases.”338 Essentially, the 
Court suggested, that power should only be used in cases in which the facts 
were undisputed, and the current case was not one of those.
339
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the early twentieth century, legal commentators in the United States 
remarked on a decline in the importance of jury trial. A prominent New 
York state judge and other writers had called for the end of jury trial in 
civil cases.
340
 
Several authors at this time claimed that the only way to save jury trial 
from terminal decline was to revive the power of trial judges to comment 
on evidence. John Henry Wigmore wrote that the loss of judicial power to 
comment on evidence “has done more than any other one thing to impair 
the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of justice.”341 If the 
power were restored, he predicted “[a] new birth of long life will then be 
open for the great and beneficent institution of Trial by Jury.”342 
 
336. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933). 
337. Id. at 393 (“So far as the facts are concerned in this case, Gentlemen of the Jury, I want to 
instruct you that whatever the Court may say as to the facts, is only the Court’s view. You are at liberty 
to entirely disregard it. The Court feels from the evidence in this case, that the Government has 
sustained the burden cast upon it by the law and has proved that this defendant is guilty in manner and 
form as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
338. Id. at 394. 
339. Id. (citing Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920)). Justices Stone and Cardozo 
dissented without opinion. Id. at 398. 
340. Joseph M. Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform, 14 A.B.A. J. 
121, 123–24 (1928) (recommending abolition of jury trial in contract cases); George M. Hogan, The 
Strangled Judge, 14 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 116, 116–17 & n.1 (1930) (describing and citing many 
articles). 
341. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 557, § 2551 (2d ed. 1923). 
342. Id. See also Hogan, supra note 340, at 117 (arguing that the public was getting impatient with 
“the jury trial where the presiding judge is present but takes no part; . . . where opposing counsel stage a 
game of emotional prejudice; . . . where juries are bewildered; and where justice miscarries” and 
claiming that these problems would be solved by allowing trial judges the power to comment on 
evidence). 
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This article suggests that a return to robust powers to comment is 
unlikely, even with relatively competent trial judges with secure tenure. 
The creation of appellate courts with separate personnel, especially for 
criminal appeals, significantly limits the discretion of trial courts in 
commenting on evidence. Even English trial judges, with their considerable 
prestige and long professional experience, have been restricted. They sum 
up the evidence, and the summing up may be influential, but comment less 
often than formerly. 
The problem of how to guide or to control the jury turns out to be 
virtually intractable. Strong judicial powers to comment invite the question 
of why the legal system should use juries at all. In England in the 
nineteenth century, judicial domination of verdicts through comment 
caused the virtual elimination of civil jury trial. Prominent commentators 
have suggested that potent judicial influence likewise calls into question 
the continuation of the criminal jury.
343
 If juries are used, strong judicial 
powers to comment may be abused, and constitute yet another ground of 
appeal based on procedure, rather than the merits of a judgment. If, on the 
other hand, judges do not comment, juries are left to their own devices in 
resolving issues of fact, and are subject to confusion and bias caused by 
counsel in the adversary system. 
 
343. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 307–08. Williams attributed the comparative success of the 
English jury, relative to its American counterpart, to “the fact that our system of summing up enables 
the judge to give the jury a lead, which the jury follow sufficiently often to give an appearance of 
reliability to the mode of trial.” Id. at 307. He further observed: “It need hardly be pointed out that this 
explanation of the jury’s success is not one that yields any very strong argument for a continuation of 
the system.” Id. 
